In this paper, I argue that Jordan acted as a rationale, self-serving actor in its negotiation processes with Israel. The kingdom gained a great deal through the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and diplomacy process. Though the treaty itself was perhaps “particularly favourable for Israel” in terms of the water agreements, other advantages from the Treaty’s conclusion made this an acceptable concession. These gains include a peaceful relationship with an increasingly powerful neighbor, the forgiveness of US debt and other economic favors, a potential step forward for a Palestinian state (and, along with it, aid in dealing with the progressively more strenuous refugee situation), and some land Jordan could not confidently hope to win back militarily.
The 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the greatest case studies in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area cooperation. It is important to understand how the peace agreement came about so that historical precedent might be used to help smooth future paths to peace. In a region still fraught with a great deal of conflict, any and all tools for peacemaking must be acquired if we are to achieve the dream of peace in the Middle East. If scholars understand the motivations behind Israel’s and Jordan’s actions, the specific “make or break” moments of the negotiation process, and exactly how the peace treaty was able to pass, they can help guide policymakers and diplomats in achieving other successful peace agreements.
In one of the world’s driest regions that is currently seeing increased desertification, conflicts and agreements over water resources are a vital part of understanding international relations and working toward successful, sustainable development. The MENA region continues to be home to dire threats of “Water War,” and vast proportions of the populations are food and/or water insecure. How large a role food and water resources play in both war and peace is an important consideration in the broader issues of political relationships, individual and state-level security, and conditions of peace and justice.
After a literature review discussing the major scholarly opinions surrounding the adoption of the 1994 Peace Treaty, this paper will present an overview of Israel and Jordan’s relational history leading up to the treaty. After a discussion of the major components of the Treaty, I will present my argument for Jordan’s rationale in accepting the agreement.
Literature Review
Various academics have explored the issue of food and water negotiations generally, cooperation over environmental issues in the Middle East specifically, and the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations particularly. Scholarly perspectives vary widely. This literature review will explore eight articles pertaining to the negotiation process, adoption, and implementation of the 1994 Peace Treaty, examining how authors present Jordanian rationale in different way.
In a 1997 article, Peter Beaumont presented the 1994 Treaty as favoring Israel almost solely, to the extent that Jordan’s support of the program seems ridiculous to the point of irrationality and impossibility. Beaumont argues that Jordan is gaining much less water under the 1994 Treaty than it would have under the Johnston Plan created in the 1950s. He concludes that it is “remarkable that Jordan should have signed such a deal” . And while he acknowledges that the water sections of the treaty are only part of a larger agreement, Beaumont fails to convincingly state that Jordan did gain from the other sections. Failing to do this has resulted in an article that makes Jordan seem like an irrational puppet without agency.
The Treaty states “The Parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international co-operation.” Some academics see this clause as greatly beneficial to Israel, even to the extent of ignoring any possible benefits from it for Jordan . This is greatly problematic, in that it portrays Jordan as an actor able to be “shoved around” by Israel. This line of thinking also fails to see the many ways that international cooperation is important for Jordan as well. It was hoped that Jordan’s treaty would lead to Israeli peace agreements with several other Arab states, furthering water negotiations . In this line of reasoning, Jordan needed Israel to join in as well due to the reality of geography and physicality of water resources.
At the time of treaty’s signing (and, arguably, today), the Arab position (in regards to Israel, regional water management, and many other issues) was greatly fragmented. Arab states did not stand unified or share policies. Elmusa argues that Arab fragmentation played a large role in Jordanian consent to the water agreements contained in the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel. Because Jordan could not count fully on Arab states to remain unified, nor did it have solid agreements and shared management with these other neighbors, the idea of segmented water management did not seem more problematic than its current reality.
Further confounding the argument that Israel gained more from the 1994 Treaty than Jordan is the “Palestinian question.” Palestine is an important actor in all MENA region cooperation, though often an informal or less recognized one. The role (or lack thereof) of Palestine in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations is interesting to explore. Palestine, if it becomes an independent state, will likely also demand access to the waters of the Jordan. This is entirely unaddressed in the 1994 Treaty. It may be assumed that negotiations over the River Jordan and Jordan’s basin for Palestine will take place entirely with Israel, as it is “Israel’s land” that Palestine will come from. In this case, Israel may not be as great a winner in the treaty as it is sometimes portrayed, as it is expected to eventually bestow some of these gains on the new Palestinian state, while Jordan’s share will remain the same.
Political scientist Allison Astorino-Courtois explores the role of the Jordanian public in accepting the 1994 Peace Treaty. Examining the issue from a marketing perspective, Astorino-Courtois argues that the Jordanian leaders had to rely not only on popular hopes for peace, but on explicit material gains different groups could hope to achieve through the treaty process. This line of reasoning is most likely to point to gains such as the forgiveness of foreign debt and a solution to the Palestinian refugee “problem” as benefits for various Jordanian populations. Greenwood echoes Astorino-Courtois’ argument that Jordanian political leaders needed to be careful in presenting and persuading the Jordanian public to accept the treaty, with Baylouny and Ryan also reinforcing the unpopularity of the treaty domestically. That the government was willing to sign the treaty in spite of the domestic battles such an agreement would necessitate are further evidence of the Jordanian government’s agency in accepting the Treaty.
An exploration of various legal frameworks about MENA region water resources by Bruch et al. concludes that Middle Eastern and North African countries should develop their legal frameworks further in order to properly care for and benefit from their scarce resources. Though one may argue that the 1994 Treaty favored Israel more than Jordan, it also provided the first legal agreement between the two countries about water usage. This gave Jordan a base from which to build further agreements and a place from which to argue about treaty violations. Thus, though it may have been less-than-ideal progress, arguably made Jordan better off than the pre-Treaty reality.
A 2008 article by Israeli scholar Itay Fischhendler argues that ambiguity in treaties can be even more destructive than if an agreement did not exist. For Fischhendler, a base from which to build further agreements is not necessarily better than the status quo. Vagueness in treaties may result in contradictory policies and claims. People and organizations may believe that the resources are being managed and regulated when, in fact, they are being mismanaged more greatly than they were prior to the agreement. But Fischhendler points to the fact that ambiguity can be a political necessity. The question then arises whether or not this ambiguity is more destructive than it is worth. The answer to this issue depends upon the other benefits gained from the agreement.
Haddadin (2002) provides a glimpse into the negotiations themselves. His presentation of the agreement processes themselves indicate that Jordan brought a good number of ideas to the table; these goals were “sacrificed” for other benefits. Again, we see Jordanian negotiators presented as rational actors with choices, who determined that giving on issues of water was acceptable to gain on others.
What were these others? Western scholars tend to emphasize the role of the United States in helping to persuade Jordan. Moore demonstrates that the United States began encouraging greater regional trade immediately after the treaty’s signing, which would aid each of the states involved along with the US. US President Bill Clinton promised to forgive Jordanian debt if a peace agreement was reached. In addition to these immediate gains, Jordan has continued reaping the benefits of the United States’ favor, as discussed by Schwedler and Naiman.
The Middle East Peace Process: A Brief Overview
On October 26, 1994, King Hussein of Jordan and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel signed the “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” hereafter known as the “Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace” or simply “Peace Treaty.” The treaty’s ratification ended a state of war between the two countries that had existed for nearly half a century since 1948. By signing the treaty, Jordan became the second Arab country to regulate and legitimize relations with Israel (the first was Egypt).
Though a state of war technically existed between the two countries since Israel’s inception, relations were not greatly hostile at all times; indeed, several scholars have written on cooperative (though sometimes clandestine) communications between the states even during armed conflict . King Hussein met with Israeli leadership fairly frequently; sometimes openly and occasionally more secretively. There were, however, periods of intense violence. Jordan participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, protesting the state’s existence. In 1967, Israel fought against an allied Egypt and Jordan; this conflict cost Jordan East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Jordan lost territory, some control over a major water resource, and a critical portion of its economy.
In 1987, Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein met in London for several hours. Their discussion led to an agreement outlining an international conference, to be hosted by the United Nations, meant to help bring about Arab-Israeli peace. Though Peres went to the meeting with the permission of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, he feared that Shamir would not back the agreement. Mistrust and the failure of the Israeli Cabinet to approve the agreement caused Shamir to block the peace conference . Hussein, discouraged, backed away from further peace initiatives for several years. But in July 1988, he relinquished sovereignty over the West Bank , hoping to respect the PLO-Israeli peace process and Palestinian state sovereignty. “These steps were taken only in response to the wish of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the prevailing Arab conviction that such measures will contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people and their glorious uprising” . October 1991 saw an international peace conference in Madrid.
From this conference came the well-known Oslo Accords, signed on September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C., and generating the famous photo of Arafat and Rabin’s handshake. When the Oslo Accords were ratified, indicating the beginning of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, increased pressure was placed on Jordan to get on board.
July 25, 1994, Rabin and Hussein signed the “Washington Declaration,” overseen by US President Bill Clinton. The state of war was officially ended. Negotiations for a full treaty were begun. The treaty was signed on October 26, 1994, in Israel’s Arava Valley by Prime Ministers Rabin and al-Majali; President Weizman and King Hussein shook hands. The Oslo Accords, and the United States’ well-publicized promotion of regional peace efforts, played a critical role in allowing the peace treaty to go forward in 1994. The Oslo Accords had indicated that a resolution to the “Palestinian question” was in sight; it was time for Jordan to acknowledge and help further this reconciliation process. The US’ desperate desire for a peaceful Middle East gave Jordan the opportunity to capitalize on potential gains from peace processes.
Findings
Content of the Treaty
The 1994 Treaty explored several issues, focusing on borders, normalization, security, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee situation, and, of course, water. It is important to bear in mind that the exact future of a potential Palestinian state was not yet decided; a great deal of the peace negotiations, and the language of the treaty, “dodged” or was purposely ambiguous to allow for eventual Palestinian involvement.
Benefit 1: Peaceful Relationships
The first benefit of the 1994 Peace Treaty is the most obvious, but not one that should be ignored. In addition to a militarily peaceful relationship (i.e., a formal end to armed conflict and warfare), peaceful relations brought with them economic and political advantages. Article 5 establishes diplomatic relations between the two countries, setting up resident ambassadors and agreeing that “the normal relationship between [Israel and Jordan] will include economic and cultural relations” . Other portions of the Treaty discuss tourist visas, open travel possibilities, and create a free trade zone. Additionally, the parties agreed to cooperate against “terrorism of all kinds,” also working together to prevent attacks and smuggling while promising not to enter the other’s territory without permission . Israel’s technological advancement was of no mean importance, either. Through the Treaty, Jordan obtained a fairly developed country as a partner in water research and acquisition. Jordan, as a friend (or, at least, not an explicit enemy) of Israel, benefits from Israel’s technology and knowledge.
Benefit 2: Forgiveness of US Debt
Not all of the benefits gained from the 1994 Peace Process were a part of the treaty itself. Then president of the United States Bill Clinton promised to forgive Jordanian debt if Hussein entered into successful peace negotiations. In addition to this debt cancellation, Hussein could expect increased aid and investment from the West after achieving peace with Israel, both because of Israel’s positive relationship with Western nations and the proof that it could cooperate with its neighbors. If Jordan proved itself to America, it would win an important ally in working with the states of the Persian Gulf, with whom Hussein hoped to reestablish economic and political relations . The hoped-for influence over and from America has proven true, as discussed by Schwedler and Naiman.
Benefit 3: A Step forward for Palestinians
In the light of the Oslo Accords, Jordan may well have hoped to win both Israel’s and the emerging Palestine’s favor by agreeing to a peace process that benefitted Israel while not granting it full autonomy. By insisting on several ambiguities and “to be determined” clauses, Jordan saw itself as helping to pave the way for a Palestinian state. It won support for the peace process from several constituencies in the process, both those who hoped for autonomy for Palestine and those who wanted the Palestinians to no longer be Jordan’s problem. By forcing Israel to claim some responsibility for the Palestinian refugees, Jordan won legitimacy in taking action against being the sole supporter of Palestinian people and perpetually facing the burdens it felt this group placed on its country.
That being said, the only time the word “Palestine” or “Palestinian” occurs explicitly in the text of the Treaty is in Article 8, which discusses refugees. The two countries state the need for a four-way committee (including Egypt and the Palestinians) to work toward refugee solutions. The role of Middle Eastern conflict is said to have created a great many refugees; it is not explicitly acknowledged that the refugees are mainly Palestinian.
Benefit 4: Water and Land
The Jordan River was named the Israeli-Jordanian border in Article 3, and it was agreed that the border would move according to any changing flow of the water. Jordan gained three hundred square kilometers in the deal. A border segment between Ein Gedi and Beit She’an was not demarcated; Jordan insisted the Palestinian Authority must be a part of that process.
Jerusalem was not discussed very explicitly in the 1994 Treaty; instead, Israel recognizes Jordan’s special relationship with Muslim holy sites in the City. The language states that Israel will grant “high priority” to Jordan’s “historic role” at these shrines during final status negotiations (it is implied that these negotiations would take place primarily with the Palestinian Authority rather than Jordan).
The word “water” is one of the most often-occurring words in the Treaty; appearing almost thirty times. An entire article (6) and an annex (II) are given to the issue. Each year, Jordan will get fifty million cubic meters (50,000,000 m3) of water (developed jointly with Israel), and Jordan owns seventy-five percent (75%) of the Yarmouk River’s water. Both parties were permitted to develop alternate water resources and reservoirs, acknowledging that “their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs” .
Though Jordan may not have “won” the water issue during the 1994 Treaty in terms of beating (=gaining more than) Israel, this does not mean the Treaty was unfavorable to it. Though Jordan did not acquire as much land or water as it had prior to Israel’s creation, it regained some of what had been taken militarily by Israel in armed conflict, land that it could not have hoped to gain back with military might.
Conclusion
King Hussein was also willing to give a little on the issue of water resources to gain other benefits from the treaty’s incorporation. Hussein’s hopes for peace are well accounted for by his desire for improved relations with the West and the region. The rest of Jordan, however, is a different story. Islamist and leftist politicians were unlikely to agree with the peace process or support it publically. Though Jordan’s Parliament is not sufficiently powerful to block Hussein’s involvement in the peace process, they could have discredited the King’s policies very publically, and a formal peace treaty could have been blocked by the Lower House. This barrier was overcome by a 1993 electoral law that gave Transjordanians enhanced political representation. This constituency in turn provided Hussein’s administration with a loyal base and a Parliament that would agree to peace processes.
Jordanians were clearly aware that they would not be able to beat Israel militarily; this no doubt increased their willingness to negotiate. But it also made them hesitant to open up borders too much: “The Israelis are much stronger than us and they will eat up our country. They will influence our culture and dominate our fragile economy”, worried a young plumber in Amman . Domestically, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ali Abu Raghib, asserted that “the success of the peace treaty hinges totally on the success of [economic] development efforts” . Hussein, along with the 1993 electoral law, also introduced certain economic policies (including the successful implementation of economic liberalization and IMF support). Additionally, he could promise enhanced economic relations with several thriving countries and benefits to all Jordanians as a result of the peace treaty.
As seen in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Process, the states of the Middle East and North Africa will not be easily forced into peaceful conditions. The region is one of sovereign states and an authority recognized by most of the world as legitimate; these entities will not easily give into other countries’ demands unless they feel they are acquiring a great deal in the process. Negotiations must include frank assessment of power relationships and assets held by actors. Powerful countries such as the US can aid the peace process by increasing countries’ incentives (as President Bill Clinton did by promising debt relief for Jordan).
Water has and will continue to be a major component of both tense relations and peace agreements. Water Wars need not occur if natural resources can be incorporated into existing and future treaties such that all actors feel they have been fairly treated and no population’s water needs are ignored.
The 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stands as an example of what negotiations can be between conflicting states and how water resources can be successfully compromised over, even when resources are tight and relationships tense.
Bibliograpy
Allan, J.A. “Water Security in the Middle East: The Hydro-Politics of Global Solutions.” SOAS/King’s College London Water Research Group.
Astorino-Courtois, Allison. 1996. “Transforming International Agreements into National Realities: Marketing Arab-Israeli Peacein Jordan.” The Journal of Politics 58(4): 1035-1054.
Baylouny, Anne Marie. “Jordan’s New ‘Political Development’ Strategy.” http://merip.org/mer/mer236/jordans-new-political-development-strategy.
Beaumont, Peter. 1997. “Dividing the Waters of the River Jordan: An Analysis of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.” Water Resources Development 13(3): 415-424.
Brecher, Michael and Mordechai Raz. 1977. “Images and Behaviour: Israel's Yom Kippur Crisis 1973.” International Journal 32(3): 475-500.
Brooks, David B. 2007. “Human Rights to Water in North Africa and the Middle East: What is New and What is Not; What is Important and What is Not.” Water Resources Development, 23(3):227–241, June 2007.
Bruch, Altman, Al-Moumin, Troell, and Roffman. 2007. “Legal Frameworks Governing Water in the Middle East and North Africa.” Water Resources Development, 23(4) 595–624.
David, Aaron. 1987. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1987: A Retrospective.” Middle East Journal 41(3): 349-360.
Elmusa, Sharif S. 1995. “The Jordan-Israel Water Agreement: A Model or an Exception?” Journal of Palestine Studies 24(3): 63-73.
Fischhendler, Itay. 2008. “When Ambiguity in Treaty Design Becomes Destructive: A Study of Transboundary Water.” Global Environmental Politics 8(1).
Glubb, J. B. and Glubb Pasha. 1954. “Violence on the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordanian View.” Foreign Affairs 32(4): 552-562.
Gotlibovski, Chemi. 1996. “The Water Economics in the Middle: Main Problems and Possible Solutions”
Greenwood, Scott. 2003. “Jordan’s ‘New Bargain:’ The Political Economy of Regime Security.” Middle East Journal 57(2): 248-268.
Haddadin, Munther J. 2002. “Water in the Middle East Peace Process.” The Geographical Journal 168(4): 324-340.
Haddadin, Munther J. 2007. "A Jordanian Socio-Legal Perspective on Water Management in the Jordan River-Dead Sea Basin." in The Jordan River and Dead Sea Basin: Cooperation Amid Conflict by Lipchin et al., eds. Springer.
Harris, Leila M. and Samer Alatout. 2010. “Negotiating hydro-scales, forging states: Comparison of the upper Tigris/Euphrates and Jordan River basins.” Political Geography 29: 148-156.
Howari, F. M., Yousef Abu-Rukah, and Rafie Shinaq. 2005. “Hydrochemical Analyses and Evaluation of Groundwater Resources of North Jordan.” Water Resources, 32(5): 555–564.
Lipchin, Pallant, Saranga, and Amster, eds. 2007. “Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East.” Springer.
Little, Douglas. 1995. “A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein, and Jordan, 1953-1970.” The International History Review, 17(3): 512-544.
Moore, Pete. 26 June 2003. "The Newest Jordan: Free Trade, Peace and an Ace in the Hole." http://merip.org/mero/mero062603.
Naiman, Robert. "No Jubilee for the Middle East?" http://merip.org/mer/mer213/no-jubilee-middle-east.
Peres, Shimon. 1995. Battling for Peace: Memoirs. Orion Books.
Ryan, Curtis. 10 June 2005. "Reform Retreats Amid Jordan's Political Storms." http://merip.org/mero/mero061005.
Rynhold, Jonathan. 2001. “Re-Conceptualizing Israeli Approaches to “Land For Peace” and the Palestinian Question Since 1967.” Israel Studies 6(2): 33-52.
Schwedler, Jillian. 30 June 2010. "Jordan's Risky Business As Usual." http://merip.org/mero/mero063010.
Shemesh, Moshe. 2010. “On Two Parallel Tracks – The Secret Jordanian-Israeli Talks (July 1967-September 1973).” Israel Studies 15(3): 87-120.
Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. October 26, 1994. Accessed 20 February 2011 at
Wolf, Aaron T. March 7-10, 1996. “‘Hydrostrategic’ Territory in the Jordan Basin: Water, War, and Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations. Presented at Water: A Trigger for Conflict/A Reason for Cooperation.
Wolf, Aaron T. 1995. Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: scarce water and its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
No comments:
Post a Comment