Islam and the State: The Role of Islam in 2010-2011 African Uprisings
March 11, 2011, an earthquake hit Tōhoku, Japan. It became the main story for most Western media outlets, dislodging what had been on the front page for several months prior: Tunisia.
Tunisia experienced heavy civil unrest beginning in December 2010. By January 2011, President Ben Ali was ousted from rule. 2011 saw a string of so-called “copycat” uprisings across North Africa and into the Middle East and central Asia, from Iran to Mauritania. Unrest is even now being seen increasingly in sub-Saharan Africa as well. This series of uprisings, riots, and civil movements has drawn a great deal of attention from Western media and academia. The events raise questions about the region’s future, the role of social media in movements, and the relationship between Islam and democracy. This paper will explore the role of Islam in the recent unrest seen mainly in North Africa. The causal levers, makeup of the various events, and their aftermaths will be discussed. The paper will begin with a literature review addressing questions of Islam and the state, exploring issues of democracy, terrorism, and Muslim political parties and governments. It will then present a brief overview of the events in Africa since December 2010. What has happened, and the way it was presented in international media, will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to the actual and perceived role of Islam in these events. The paper will conclude with a discussion about possible future directions for Islam in the region.
Islam and the State
The West is home to many ill-conceived misunderstandings about Islam. Many of these revolve around the relationship between Islam and the state. Islam existing in a “secular state” has come to be oxymoronic for Westerners who only know of Islam as a repressive religion enforcing women’s oppression and demanding hardliner Shari’a law in state government. It is thought that Islam and democracy are “not compatible,” and many academics and political commentators acknowledge the widely-believed myth that Arab and African people are too “immature” for democracy . The reality is not so clear-cut.
Ottaway and Carothers acknowledge that “the region appears to repel democracy.” In 2004, they argued that change would come not from liberal Arab activists and Westerners, but from the Islamist parties. Here, a word must be said about the confusion between “Islamist” and “fundamentalist” groups. The terms are not clear-cut or well defined in academic or media discourse. Abootalebi provides a discussion about the two, asserting that the Iranian revolution may have helped to shape the distinction. “Fundamentalist” Islam refers to the more traditional views whose supporters claim sole authority to properly interpret religious texts. In religious studies, “fundamentalists” are generally those members of a religion who focus on the texts themselves. Fundamentalists are generally not politically active, instead centering their attention on family life and personal piety. Since 9/11, however, the term “fundamentalism” has come to seem synonymous with Islam-based terrorism. The media is not clear about its use of the term. Further confusing the discussion is the emergence of the term “Islamism,” which generally refers to political action with Islam at its center. Abootalebi argues that Islamism, unlike traditional fundamentalism, can incorporate the idea that Islamic tenets can coexist with democracy. But so-called “Islamist” parties are often equated by Western media with terrorist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt with branches in many African and Middle Eastern countries, is often depicted as in cahoots with al Qaeda and other fundamentalist, terrorist organizations.
Anthropologists and comparative political scientists have been fighting the myth of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy for some time now. Nor is it only liberal academics who believe the two can coexist. In a 2002 article, Mark Tessler presents information about individual interviews conducted with people in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine. He asserts that “Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic society” and that issues of personal piety generally did not affect notions of democracy, especially for male respondents. Robert Hefner, professor of anthropology at Boston University, writes extensively on Islamic and Qur’anic schooling, and has also published on the relationship between Islam and the state. In an essay written reflecting on Islam since September 11th, Hefner points out that the acts of terrorism performed that day were not only against the West, but also against liberal, democratically-minded Muslims . The debate on Islam’s compatibility with democracy, Hefner points out, is not a clash of Arab vs. West, but of Muslim vs. Muslim, a question of internal religious interpretation. These questions have many parallels with the democratization of Christianity seen in Western history.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, has been arguing for the compatibility of Islam and democracy for more than two decades. He sees his faith as consistent with democracy and freedom and argues for the right of Muslims to dissent against mainstream religious opinion without fear .
Though the West tends to portray Arab and African states as anti-democratic, and thus Islam as anti-democratic. But there currently exists a multitude of states and systems that have successfully navigated Islam and democracy in the same space. The world’s largest Muslim nation is not in the Middle East, nor is it an Arab state. Robert Hefner’s Civil Islam explores the processes of democratization in Indonesia. In the midst of violence in the 1960s, an Islamic movement for democracy emerged. The religion played a vital role in the violent regime’s overthrow. Today, Indonesia serves as an example of a state that is simultaneously Muslim, democratic, and pro-women’s rights. Malaysia and Turkey as well serve as counter-examples to the claim that a “Muslim democracy” is not possible.
Anthropological arguments serve a key role in these discussions. The anthropology of religion is perhaps one of the most relevant academic disciplines in questions of the relationship between Islam and the state, as the anthropology of religion explores the connections between religion and society, studying how religious movements and ideologies affect cultural values and vice versa. Anthropological arguments can help to explain the multiplicity of interpretations found in the diverse world of Islam, highlighting where and how Islam is used to support democracy.
Overview of Events
Organizers of civil movements in North Africa report that discussions and planning has been occurring for months, and no one will dispute that there have been quiet grumblings in select circles against corrupt leaders and strict regimes for years. But the start date generally given to the recent series of events is December 18, 2010, the day that Mohamed Bouazizi, a street produce vendor, set himself on fire . The self-immolation struck a chord for many Tunisians, and the action began. On January 14, 2011, African protestors saw their first major victory as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, one of African’s infamous Big Men (a term given to African dictators, most of whom have been in power since independence and were placed there and continually supported by Western powers), stepped down and fled the country .
Since Ben Ali left power, Egypt’s Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak was also ousted . Libya has seen protests since February 15, 2011, and is now in a state of serious armed conflict, debatably termed a civil war. Major protests in Algeria began on December 28 and won the end of Algeria’s nineteen-year-old state of emergency. Minor protests have also been seen in Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, North and South Sudan, and Western Sahara. Protests in these countries are often grouped as part of the “MENA region uprisings,” but protests based on similar complaints have been seen throughout most of Africa, including in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Swaziland, and Uganda.
“Copycat” Revolutions?
The word “copycat” was seen frequently in media as the unrest seemed to “spread” from Tunisia across the region . And though certain techniques were borrowed or imitated (most noticeably the self-immolation, which had been proven successful in gaining great international attention), it is vital that the uprisings not be viewed as a homogenous group. For too long, Africa and Islam have been treated as homogenous entities, the great diversity between and within African countries ignored and the variety of Islamic interpretations disregarded. The uprisings across Africa and the Middle East share some similar causes: poverty and economic woes, anger at governmental corruption and human rights abuses. But these no more make the protests in Tunisia and Djibouti identical than the American and French Revolutions. In an attempt to avoid further homogenization, each of the movements will be discussed independently. Attention will be focused on motivations and methods of each movement with particular emphasis given to the role of Islam where applicable.
Tunisia
The basic facts of Tunisia’s revolution have already been presented. (For the purposes of this paper, Tunisia and Egypt will be identified as “revolutions” because they have overthrown a specific government and institutional changes are in progress. It is important to note that this is not an uncontested term.)
Several causal factors have been cited as motivations for the unrest. For Bouazizi, the most direct were unemployment and food inflation. Tunisia’s well-educated citizenry has faced a 13-15% unemployment rate for the last decade and high labor market rigidity . Unaffordable food prices drew even greater attention to the country’s extreme inequality. People and organizations began to rally around the greater issues of corruption and political freedoms as well .
Tunisia’s revolution was politico-economic. “[M]en and women marched side by side, holding hands and chanting together in the name of civil rights, not Islam” . But this is not to say that religion was absent from the events. Tunisia is a predominately Muslim country. The state religion is Islam and the President must be Muslim, but freedom of religion is enshrined in the Constitution and the culture is fairly secular. Muslims were involved in the revolution (on both sides), and mosques were used as rallying points – but not a rallying cry. Tunisia’s was not an Islamic revolution. That being said, Islam remains a strong actor in social life. The main Muslim movement (Ennahdha, “Renaissance”), banned under the dictatorship, is reorganizing. Some indications of fundamentalism have been seen since Ben Ali’s resignation (in Tunis, security forces were called in to protect brothels from zealot mobs ), but Islamic law does not seem likely; even Ennahdha opposes it, hoping instead that Tunisia will adopt a model like Turkey or Malaysia’s. Historian Amy Kallander believes that the possibility of an Islamist resurgence in Tunisia is vastly overdone in international media; however, at the time she wrote this article, Rashid al-Ghannoushi (a founder of Ennahdha) was still in exile . Al-Ghannoushi was able to return on January 30, four days after Kallander’s piece was published . For some, al-Ghannoushi’s return signals the true end to Tunisia’s one-party ruler; others can read the events as a validation of concerns over increasing fundamentalism in Tunisia.
Egypt
Egypt, the only other country that has had an official change in leadership as a result of the 2010-2011 actions, began publically with the January 25 Revolution. Protestors, through a series of marches and mainly nonviolent civil resistance techniques (including demonstrations and labor strikes), demanded the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. They won it February 11 . Egyptian protestors suffered from complaints of food price inflation, unemployment, and low wages; however, the protests were mainly political .
Islam is the state religion of Egypt and the majority of the population are Sunni Muslims. Though there is some lip service given to religious freedom, the government has placed restrictions on this freedom. Religious minorities, particularly Jews, can face high formal and informal barriers to employment and equality. Islamic political activism is strong. Egypt is home to the well-known Society of the Muslim Brothers (“the Muslim Brotherhood”), which espouses the idea that “Islam is the solution.” The Muslim Brotherhood was not a major actor in the revolution itself, nor was the revolution an Islamic one . But post-Mubarak, people are beginning to wonder just how revolutionary the “revolution” truly was, as the Supreme Council continues to enact laws, and how democratic Egypt will remain, “as the Islamist trends continue to expand their political influence” . The Muslim Brotherhood, unlike many more liberal parties, has remained organized during Mubarak’s years. Though it did not participate in the revolution itself, it was in a strong place to take action after Mubarak fell . Political analysts worried that, were elections to be held too soon, a victory would essentially be handed to the Brotherhood, thanks to their organization. The party insists, however, that they “want to participate, not to dominate” arguing that “Secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy” . The extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood will be involved in Egyptian politics remains to be seen, as does Islam’s future in regards to the state.
Libya
Perhaps the greatest unknown at the time this paper is being written lies with Libya. The uncertainty is reflected in the language used by international media. Are the events a revolutionary attempt, a rebellion, or a civil war?
Libya’s protests started out in much the same way as Tunisia and Egypt’s, with peaceful protests on the streets. But Colonel Muammar Muhammad al-Gaddafi did not respond peacefully; protestors have faced violent responses from the government since February 15 . The protests are now organized and well run. An Interim Transitional National Council has formed and released an eight-point plan for a democratic Libya . The main motivation for Libyan rebels is now democratic elections. Thanks to Libya’s oil wealth and relative small population, the country has fared well in economic and political development. But its corruption index is worse than both Tunisia and Egypt , and oil riches have not been shared equally. Nor has the country always been unified. The East, main home of the current rebellion, was separated from the West under Roman rule, and the monarch who was overthrown by Gaddafi hailed from the East. Gaddafi’s general mistreatment of his eastern citizens did not help ease tensions along the fault line .
As with Tunisia and Egypt, protests have been mainly focused on issues of democracy and freedom. Islam, though, too, is a major tension. Libya is a devoutly Muslim country, and Gaddafi is far from devout. Muslim protestors point out that Gaddafi has degraded holy scriptures, shut down Qur’anic schools, and replaced the Islamic lunar calendar. Most of the country’s religious leaders have urged Muslims to support the rebellion, going so far as to release a fatwa (religious opinion) . Gaddafi’s government has accused the rebels of including al-Qaeda members; the rebels – many of whom are civilians (teachers, lawyers, students) – deny it . NATO’s commander Stavridis has acknowledged that ‘flickers’ of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah presence have been seen, but the extent is unclear .
Algeria
December 2010 saw protests in Algeria over housing and employment concerns . Protests continued over these issues as well as anger over food prices, corruption, and constraints on freedom of speech. Protests were illegal without government permission during the nineteen-year state of emergency. In late February, the government finally agreed to lift the state of emergency, allowing for greater individual and group freedoms for Algerians . Few protests pushed for the actual resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika; he stated on April 15 that he would seek to “reinforce representative democracy” through constitutional amendments . Economic woes and protests continue.
The state of emergency was instilled after a military coup d’état overthrew the Islamic Salvation Front, after the FIS gained victory in Algeria’s first free parliamentary election . In Algeria, then, we see lesser democracy and political freedoms granted in the name of preventing Islamic fundamentalism from gaining ground. The Islamic parties that continued in Algerian coalition during the state of emergency were essentially “neutered” by the government, as they made compromises to remain in power and lost their support base as they became less fundamentalist . Lifting the state of emergency could thus be a hindrance or a help to Algeria’s Islamic parties.
Angola
Luanda, the capital city of Angola, saw a demonstration in its Independence Square in early March. The internet was used; a website was created a few weeks prior to the physical revolution calling for President José Eduardo dos Santos’ 32-year rule to end . And though Angola’s Constitution, revised in January 2010, gives citizens the right to peacefully protest, the government arrested seventeen individuals and explicitly stated that they would squash future demonstrators . Opposition parties in the country have not participated in the protests; many leaders believe the time is not yet fully ripe. People are also suspicious of the revolution movement: The organizers of the website and protest are anonymous. Islam is a minority religion in Angola; no strong statement about the regime or the protests from Muslim leaders have reached the international stage thus far.
Benin
An election was held in Benin on March 13; President Boni Yayi claimed reelection but opponent Adrien Houngbedji claimed he had won. Youth protests in support of Houngbedji have been broken up by police . Labor union leaders are complaining that many were left out of polling . As with the Ivory Coast, Benin’s protests seem to be almost entirely political; religion has not entered the conversation explicitly.
Côte d’Ivoire
The Ivory Coast has been well-known in international media thanks to President Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to step down even after the apparent loss of elections. Gbagbo held a swearing in ceremony while protestors clamored for Ouattara to be given power . March 2011 saw the killing of several protestors, including women, as they continued to struggle for Gbagbo to leave . For months, he refused to concede the election and step down, despite domestic and international pressure. Côte d’Ivoire stands out from the other countries mentioned here in the direct involvement of external powers in the results; UN and French military tools were required to physically remove him from office . In Côte d’Ivoire, the people were not struggling for the vote so much as the enforcement of that vote; the appararent need for external forces does not bode well for the future of democracy.
There is a strong presense of Islam in the Ivory Coast, but it does not strongly dominate other religions. Religious tolerance is a key characteristic of political climate, particularly cooperation between Muslims and Christians. Islam does not seem to have played a large role in the recent presidential upheaval.
Djibouti
In 2010, President Ismail Omar Guelleh altered the Djiboutian constitution, allowing him to run for a third six-year term as president in the April 2011 elections. Djiboutian protests have focused mainly on protesting this action, pressuring Guelleh to step down. Protest actions on January 28 were responded to with violence by the Djiboutian police force. Protests ended March 11, when a US contingent meant to oversee the elections were expelled from the country . The April 2011 elections were boycotted by the opposition, but Guelleh promised not to seek a fourth term if he won the third , as he did . Though Djibouti’s protest was not religiously-based, it is interesting to note that the first protest broke out after Friday prayer in the Muslim-majority country .
Kenya
Protests in Kenya have been focused on commodity prices , particularly maize. The Kenyan government recently reduced the tax on fuel, but citizens are protesting the cuts were not large enough. Protestor Yash Pal Ghai, an expert in constitutional law, cited both prices and corruption as causal factors for the protests. The irony and inappropriateness of luxury cars driven by politicians traveling to debate rising food prices is not lost on the starving Kenyan public .
Approximately 10% of Kenyan people are Muslim; religion was not an obvious player in the protests. Nor were politics, all that explicitly. Indeed, the protests in Kenya seem to reflect the food riots of the ‘70s more than the political revolutions of North Africa today.
Mauritania
Mauritania is an Islamic Republic whose current president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz renounces Islamic fundamentalism. Riches from gold, oil, minerals, and fish make a select few in Mauritania wealthy while the majority of the population lives off agriculture. On January 17, 2011, “Mauritania’s “Bouazizi” died as Yacoub Ould Dahoud set himself on fire. Unlike Bouazizi, Dahoud was employed and a fairly well-off businessmen. His self-immolation was well thought out as a protest against corruption and oppression .
Mauritania has had coup d’états in both 2005 and 2008; Islam does not seem to have been a primary cause for either, nor for the current protests.
Morocco
Morocco has seen protests with similar slogans to Tunisia and Egypt’s (“Down with dictatorship!,” “End the corruption!.” “We want change!”); one protestor even explicitly stated “This is our Tahrir Square” . But though corruption, unemployment, and inequality are nearly as bad or worse in Morocco as in other North African states, the majority of the Moroccan people – including the protestors – are not calling for revolution and do not wish to overthrow King Mohammed VI. Compared to Hassan II, the current king is an angel. There have been improvements in family law favoring greater gender equality and near-constant streams of slow but steady improvements. It seems that Mohammed VI is doing just enough to help the people to avoid “mutiny.” In response to protests, the king has made several public promises and recently pardoned or reduced the sentences of nearly two hundred prisoners, including Islamist political prisoners . Islamist leaders and organizations have played a visible role in the protests; most notably Adl wal Ihsan, which is currently banned from politics . Protest demands include parliamentary elections; it is possible that elections in the current political and cultural climate would result in greater representation for Islamic parties in the government.
Senegal
Senegal, a moderate Muslim democracy, has also seen self-immolation. A February 18 protestor, Oumar Boucom, carried a sign reading “Work or Die” as he burned himself at the president’s Dakar palace . Protests focus on politico-economic woes, including unhappiness over President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempted third term run. An attempted march in Dakar’s main square was planned for March 19, marking the eleventh year of Boucom’s leadership. Organizers were nicknaming the square “Tahrir” for the day .
Sudan
Sudan received a good deal of attention in international media during its referendum vote earlier this year. But in spite of the civil war and drama over the vote, the country has also seen protests over issues of prices and corruption. The youth have been heavily involved in Sudan, as they were in Tunisia and Egypt, and have drawn solidarity from those movements, chanting lines like “Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan together as one” as they protest . The Sudanese protests have been smaller scale than Tunisia and Egypt’s but well-organized; again, the use of Facebook as an organizing tool is seen . International media focused on the Sudanese protests have included some of the most explicit “copycat” and “spread” language; this is likely thanks in part to the words of the protestors themselves. That South Sudan is now emerging as a new state, indicates its distrust of governmental officials and hatred of corruption and neglect, though; one can hardly credit revolutionaries in Tunisia with giving Sudanese protestors a taste for liberty! The protests in both regions resulted in a public promise from Sudan’s current president; al-Bashir has declared he will not seek reelection in 2014 .
Surprisingly, discourse about the protests in Sudan have been virtually silent on the role of Islam, though Sudan has been the world’s only Sunni republic. This is far from the case in discussions about the civil war itself; anthropologist Sondra Hale and others have highlighted the way Islam is understood by the many actors in the conflict . Religious language has been used by the government itself; the ruling National Congress Party recently created a program of “Cyber Jihad” meant to crack down on internet-based protest organizing .
Swaziland
Swaziland is Africa’s last remaining absolute monarchy. It, too, saw protests for democracy in April 2011. The movement was quickly quieted by police . The organizers in Swaziland were primarily unions, similar to the revolutionary leaders in Tunisia and Egypt (that is, the educated middle class); however, Swazi leaders were fighting against both the monarchy and the average Swazi, who holds a great deal of reverence for the monarchy . The protest movement in Swaziland has seen virtually no positive result.
Uganda
Like Kenya, Uganda has seen protests primarily over food and commodity prices . Indicating that the protests were unlikely to be purely economic, though, is the fact that a couple of presidential candidates who did not gain victory in the February 2011 elections were arrested (Kizza Besigye and Norbert Mao) . Islam is present in Uganda but not a major player; these protests also seemed primarily political.
Western Sahara
As in Morocco, the peaceful protests in Western Sahara have been particularly conspicuous for one particular factor: they have not requested the ruling leader to step aside. Instead, protestors in Western Sahara are asking that more attention and funding is given to the Sahwari army (improved salaries, attention to martyrs’ families, etc.). In the midst of a war for recognition and independence against Morocco, protestors are also speaking out against tribalism and corruption in their government, clamoring for stronger institutions and funding oversight . Here, democracy is being demanded even from a government not even recognized internationally as a true state.
The protests in the Western Sahara can hardly be termed “copycat,” however: They began in October 2010. Academics, including Noam Chomsky, are citing these protests as the true beginning of the protest movement . Islam was not a major actor in the Western Saharan protests, nor does it play a huge role in the everyday political climate of the territory.
Conclusions
Comparing Events
It is dangerous – and unjust – “to assume that revolutions occurring simultaneously have the same root causes” . And so we must take caution in making comparisons about these revolutions, particularly as they are ongoing. Africans are not one people with identical demands; even protesting groups in a single country or movement have differing requests. With this concern in mind, it can be helpful to explore some of the similarities and differences between the movements, particularly where it is noted by the protestors themselves.
Information technology has played a large role in all of the movements. Some analysts are going so far as to dub the protests in Tunisia and Egypt the “Twitter Revolutions.” Proponents of IT aid to developing countries cheer at this demonstration of its power; cynics criticize Western media for crediting Western technologies with the spread of democracy rather than the African people themselves. Both positions are probably too extreme. The protestors themselves have repeatedly highlighted the important role of technology in organizing the activities and mobilizing support. Through increased access to mobile phones and media sources, people across Africa have been able to follow the events in Tunisia and Egypt. The fact that protestors in sub-Saharan Africa nickname their protests “Tahrir” indicates the inspiration seemingly successful movements have had. Websites have aided organizers in making their activities and demands public. But it is important to note that information technologies have played a facilitative, not originating, role in each of these movements. Facebook did not cause the unrest in Tunisia anymore than the English cannon caused the Hundred Years’ War.
In many ways, the role of IT in these movements is analogous to the role of Islam. Islam has played a large role in organizing and supporting many of the protest movements. In some countries, this role has been explicit, as Islamic parties endorsed or even led protest movements. In others, Islam has served a supportive role, with mosques providing meeting space for organizers and an ideology of equality and human rights from which the protestors built their rationale. Like IT, Islam did not cause the revolutions and uprisings.
But nor did it stand in their way. This is perhaps the greatest lesson from the 2010-2011 African uprisings in regards to the role of Islam in the state and politics. The sometimes supportive and virtually never opposing role of Islam in the recent events seems to shatter, once and for all, the uncompromising idea that Islam is entirely incompatible with democratic ideas. Indeed, the fact that those states with the most success were predominately Muslim might even be used as an argument for a statement in the opposite direction. The truth likely lies somewhere between both poles. Countries that are predominately Muslim are less likely to have strong divisions along lines of ethnicity or language. The emphasis in Islam on literacy and the Arabic language has proved of us to the uprisings, easing communication and aiding in more egalitarian participation. This is not to say that Islam should be singularly credited, but its role should not be entirely dismissed either. Islam and democracy are not antithetical systems. Islam, like any religion or ideology, can be co-opted for a variety of purposes. It can be used to oppress and to liberate, to change and to keep in place.
Future Directions for Islam and the State
The uprisings took most political analysts by surprise. Anthropologists have long been aware of opposition and the multiplicity of viewpoints in Africa and the Middle East, of course, but most did not predict strong, organized movements to emerge. In the tumult of uncertainty, academics are making predictions on the record, only to be proven wrong within twelve hours. The future of the region is unclear, as is the role of Islam in regional and state politics. I will presume to make a few general statements, however.
1. The worries over a resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism are a bit excessive.
Since Mubarak stepped down, several international media outlets and popular figures have expressed concern over the possibility of Islamic fundamentalism stepping in to fill the power vacuum. These fears seem excessive and offensive. We cannot simultaneously applaud the Tunisian and Egyptian people for their powerful, peaceful organizing strategies and patronize them for their inability to reign in fundamentalism. Contrarily, several cables from WikiLeaks indicated that corrupt African regimes were using fear over Islamic fundamentalism as a bargaining tool to gain Western support . The United States backed Ben Ali as a block to al Qaeda.
The Muslim Brotherhood is seen by many as a radical, Islamist party. The leadership of the party denies that it is strictly fundamentalist and voiced its desire to work within democratic systems. Indeed, rather than being the fundamentalist enemy, the Brotherhood may serve as the friendly compromise. If a democratic system is put in place and the Brotherhood allowed to participate, it may be able to garner support from bases previously endorsing al Qaeda, alleviating concerns over extra-governmental fundamentalism and instead moderating Islamism within the system .
2. Islam is not disappearing from the region.
The protests have been primarily politico-economic in nature. Africans are demonstrating against corruption and high prices and for human rights and freedoms. Some have characterized these goals as “secular” and the uprisings as indicating a move away from Islam. Such a position is demeaning to both the people and to Islam. One’s religion need not be the only motivation in one’s life. Nor does a desire for the separation of church and state eliminate the idea of religion from public and individual life. An-Na’im discusses the mutual dependency of secularism and religion on each other .
Islam is not “dead” in Africa. On the contrary, it may face a rise as people experience greater freedom to move and practice the religion in their preferred way.
3. We have not seen the end.
Protests are ongoing. The true outcome of Egypt and Tunisia’s “revolutions” is unclear, even though two prominent figures have been ousted from power. Whether or not power will shift in Libya is unclear. The protests increasingly occurring in sub-Saharan Africa may become stronger.
Academics and politicians find themselves in a tricky position of late. They must make decisions based on unclear futures. What is clear is that the people will no longer passively accept their fate. If there is one thing that can be learned from the recent events in the Middle East and Africa, it is that one cannot take the status quo for granted. Islam, states, and people are changing.
Works Cited
Abend, Lisa. 22 February 2011. “Protests in Morocco: Just Don’t Call It a Revolution.” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052901,00.html?xid=fbshare.
AFP. “Moroccans stage peaceful pro-democracy protests.” http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jLVsfu60TI8Ev8KlOaNQdZgp5uNw?docId=CNG.f9dc8540002b694b3f07a574f74a6ed3.ce1.
Afrol News. 5 March 2011. “Peaceful Western Sahara anti-government protests.” http://www.afrol.com/articles/37529.
Al Jazeera, 5 March 2011. “Ivorian women protesters killed.” http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/03/20113551020308848.html.
18 February 2011. “Djiboutians rally to oust president.” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/02/201121816513686216.html.
Al Jazeera. 20 April 2011. “Kenyans protest against rising prices.” http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/04/201142044515958464.html.
25 April 2011. “Protestors demand reform in Morocco.” http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/04/201142512013759717.html.
4 December 2010. “Ivorians’ swearing-in confusion.” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/12/201012433934604328.html.
30 December 2010. “Scores hurt in Algeria protests.” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/12/2010123012345588575.html.
8 April 2011. “Djibouti votes in presidential poll.” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/04/201148618438625.html.
11 February 2011. “Triumph as Mubarak quits.” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011211164636605699.html
Alexander, Christopher. 3 January 2011. “Tunisia’s protest wave: where it comes from and what it means.” Foreign Policy Online. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/02/tunisia_s_protest_wave_where_it_comes_from_and_what_it_means_for_ben_ali.
AllAfrica.com. 24 March 2011. “Benin: Police Firm Tear Gas to Break Up Youth Protest.” http://allafrica.com/stories/201103250014.html.
An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 1990. Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
2005. “The Interdependence of Religion, Secularism, and Human Rights: Prospects for Islamic Societies.” Common Knowledge 11(1): 65-80.
Associated Press. 14 April 2011. “Organizers urge determination after Swaziland protests overwhelmed by police violence.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/organizers-urge-determination-after-swazi-protests-overwhelmed-by-police-violence/2011/04/14/AFuK1VaD_story.html.
20 April 2011. “Protests in Kenya, Uganda as Africa bears brunt of global rise in food costs” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/protests-in-kenya-uganda-as-africa-bears-brunt-of-global-rise-in-food-costs/2011/04/20/AFqXqHBE_story.html.
30 January 2011. “Islamist leader returns to Tunisia.” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/30/tunisian-islamist-party-leader-returns-home/.
Ba, Diadie. 17 March 2011. “Senegal braces for ‘Tahrir Square’ protest day.” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/17/us-senegal-protest-idUSTRE72G8E220110317?WT.tsrc=Social%20Media&WT.z_smid=twtr-reuters_%20com&WT.z_smid_dest=Twitter.
BBC. 10 March 2011. “Libya crisis: Rebellion or civil war?” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12690713.
11 April 2011. “Ivory Coast: Gbagbo held after assault on residence.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13039825.
12 February 2011. “Egypt crisis: President Hosni Mubarak resigns as leader.” BBC Online. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045.
14 January 2011. “Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced out.” BBC Online. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12195025.
21 February 2011. “Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir ‘will not seek re-election.’” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12521427/.
22 February 2011. “Algeria’s state of emergency to be lifted ‘imminently.’” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12546346.
23 March 2011. “Sudan to unleash cyber jihadists.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12829808.
Bearak, Barry. 12 April 2011. “Police Officers in Swaziland Squash Rally for Democracy.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/world/africa/13swaziland.html?_r=1&scp=27&sq=africa%20protest&st=cse.
Brown, Jack. 20 January 2011. “Algeria’s Midwinter Uproar.” Middle East Research and Information Project. http://merip.org/mero/mero012011.
Butters, Andrew Lee. 7 February 2011. “How the Egyptian Uprising is Changing the Muslim Brotherhood.” Time Magazine Online. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046725,00.html.
CNN. 9 February 2011. “Muslim Brotherhood: ‘We are not seeking power.’” http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-09/world/egypt.muslim.brotherhood_1_muslim-brotherhood-brotherhood-candidates-parliamentary-bloc?_s=PM:WORLD.
Dekhnstan. 23 January 2011. “Mauritania’s Bouazizi Died Today” http://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2011/01/23/mauritanias-bouazizi-died-today/.
Democracy Now! 17 February 2011. “‘The Genie Is Out of the Bottle’: Assessing a Changing Arab World with Noam Chomsky and Al Jazeera’s Marwan Bishara.” http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/17/the_genies_are_out_of_the.
Edwards, William. 16 February 2011. “Violent protests rock Libyan city of Benghazi.” France 24 Online. http://www.france24.com/en/20110216-libya-violent-protests-rock-benghazi-anti-government-gaddafi-egypt-tunisia-demonstration.
El-Errian, Essam. 9 February 2011. “What the Muslim Brothers Want.” The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/opinion/10erian.html?_r=2.
Faucon, Benoît. 16 April 2011. “Algeria Leader Vows to ‘Reinforce’ Democracy.” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703327404576194363244985344.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
Fuller, Thomas. 20 February 2011. “Next Question for Tunisia: The Role of Islam in Politics.” The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/world/africa/21tunisia.html?_r=2.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2 February 2011. “Young Sudanese Start Protest Movement.” The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/africa/03sudan.html?_r=1.
Gillis, Clare Morgana. 29 March 2011. “Libyan rebels: ‘We’re not al-Qaeda.’” http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-libyans30_ST_N.htm.
Guardian. 29 March 2011. “A vision of a democratic Libya.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/29/vision-democratic-libya-interim-national-council.
Hefner, Robert W. “September 11 and the Struggle for Islam.” Social Science Research Council. http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/hefner.htm.
---. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Huffington Post. Live Blog. “Tunisia Revolution News (Latest Updates).” Huffington Post Online. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/14/tunisia-revolution-live-u_n_809294.html#19_copycat-immolation-protests.
Humphrey, Shawn. 24 February 2011. “Benin, Senegal, Mauritania Impacted by Protest Movements.” http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110224/pl_ac/7929736_benin_senegal_mauritania_impacted_by_protest_movements.
Hurriyet. 8 February 2011. “Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, Egypt subject of latest WikiLeaks.” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=islamic-fundamentalism-in-turkey-egypt-subject-of-latest-wikileaks-releases-2011-02-08.
The Interim Transitional National Council of the Libyan Republic. http://ntclibya.org/english/council-members/.
Kallander, Amy Aisen. 26 January 2011. “Tunisia’s Post-Ben Ali Challenge.” Middle East Research and Information Project. http://merip.org/mero/mero012611.
Kron, Josh. 11 April 2011. “Police Move Swiftly to Prevent Protest in Uganda.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/africa/12uganda.html?scp=3&sq=africa%20protest&st=cse.
Kushkush, Isma’il Kamal. 30 January 2011. “Sudanese police, students clash in the capital.” http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-30/world/sudan.student.protests_1_students-clash-protests-sudanese-police?_s=PM:WORLD.
Maathai, Wangari. 8 March 2011. “These winds of change may now reach across the Sahara.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/08/revolution-winds-change-reach-across-sahara?INTCMP=SRCH.
MacQueen, Benjamin. 27 January 2011. “Q&A: What’s behind the unrest?” World News Australia. http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1473531/Q&A--What-s-behind-the-unrest-.
Marzouki, Nadia. 19 January 2011. “Tunisia’s Wall Has Fallen.” Middle East Research and Information Project. http://merip.org/mero/mero011911.
Moghul, Haroon. 29 January 2011. “4 Reasons Why Egypt’s Revolution Is Not Islamic.” Huffington Post Online. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/haroon-moghul/4-reasons-why-egypts-revo_b_815848.html.
Noueihed, Lin. 19 January 2011. “Peddler’s martyrdom launched Tunisia’s revolution.” Reuters. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/uk-tunisia-protests-bouazizi-idUKTRE70I7TV20110119.
Pawson, Lara. 8 March 2011. “Angola is stirred by the spirit of revolution.” The Guardian Online. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/08/angola-spirit-revolution.
Reuters. 21 February 2011. “Libyan Islamic leaders urge Muslims to rebel.” http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE71K1TQ20110221.
9 April 2011. “Djibouti president leads in vote, calls for unity” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/09/djibouti-elections-idUSLDE73801620110409.
Richards, Charles. 9 February 1993. “Algeria uses emergency law to fight Islamic group.” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/algeria-uses-emergency-law-to-fight-islamic-group-1471880.html.
Sajedi, Mohyeddin. 23 April 2011. “Al-Qaeda no successor to Arab dictators.” http://www.presstv.ir/detail/176339.html.
Simpson, John. 29 March 2011. “Halt to rebel advance creates Libyan divide.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12901820.
Sondra Hale. 1999. “Mothers and Militias: Islamic State Construction of Women Citizens of Sudan.” Citizenship Studies 3(3): 373-386.
Stacher, Joshua. 7 April 2011. “Egypt Without Mubarak.” Middle East Research and Information Project. http://merip.org/mero/mero040711.
Straziuso, Jason. 17 March 2011. “Djibouti evicts US vote group ahead of election.” http://www.ksl.com/?nid=235&sid=14765694&s_cid=rss-235.
Tessler, Mark. 2002. “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries.” Comparative Politics 34(3): 337-354.
Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results.” http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.
Waxman, Sharon. 13 February 2011. “Egypt’s Revolt: Puncturing the Myth of Arab Immaturity.” Huffington Post Online. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharon-waxman/egypts-revolt-puncturing_b_822634.html.
World Bank. Tunisian Country Data. Accessed 4 April 2011 at
World Economic Forum, Africa Competitiveness Report 2009. Accessed 4 April 2011 at
No comments:
Post a Comment