Jordanian Rationale in the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel

“Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the ‘Parties’) effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.” In 1994, nearly half a century of war was ended with the “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” A great deal of the violence prior to this agreement was due in large part to tensions over the Jordan Basin and River Jordan. In the settlement over this dispute contained in the 1994 Treaty; Israel was granted a great deal more of the Jordan River’s water resources than Jordan. Why, if the treaty was “particularly favourable for Israel” , did Jordan agree to it?
In this paper, I argue that Jordan acted as a rationale, self-serving actor in its negotiation processes with Israel. The kingdom gained a great deal through the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and diplomacy process. Though the treaty itself was perhaps “particularly favourable for Israel” in terms of the water agreements, other advantages from the Treaty’s conclusion made this an acceptable concession. These gains include a peaceful relationship with an increasingly powerful neighbor, the forgiveness of US debt and other economic favors, a potential step forward for a Palestinian state (and, along with it, aid in dealing with the progressively more strenuous refugee situation), and some land Jordan could not confidently hope to win back militarily.
The 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the greatest case studies in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area cooperation. It is important to understand how the peace agreement came about so that historical precedent might be used to help smooth future paths to peace. In a region still fraught with a great deal of conflict, any and all tools for peacemaking must be acquired if we are to achieve the dream of peace in the Middle East. If scholars understand the motivations behind Israel’s and Jordan’s actions, the specific “make or break” moments of the negotiation process, and exactly how the peace treaty was able to pass, they can help guide policymakers and diplomats in achieving other successful peace agreements.
In one of the world’s driest regions that is currently seeing increased desertification, conflicts and agreements over water resources are a vital part of understanding international relations and working toward successful, sustainable development. The MENA region continues to be home to dire threats of “Water War,” and vast proportions of the populations are food and/or water insecure. How large a role food and water resources play in both war and peace is an important consideration in the broader issues of political relationships, individual and state-level security, and conditions of peace and justice.
After a literature review discussing the major scholarly opinions surrounding the adoption of the 1994 Peace Treaty, this paper will present an overview of Israel and Jordan’s relational history leading up to the treaty. After a discussion of the major components of the Treaty, I will present my argument for Jordan’s rationale in accepting the agreement.

Literature Review
Various academics have explored the issue of food and water negotiations generally, cooperation over environmental issues in the Middle East specifically, and the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations particularly. Scholarly perspectives vary widely. This literature review will explore eight articles pertaining to the negotiation process, adoption, and implementation of the 1994 Peace Treaty, examining how authors present Jordanian rationale in different way.
In a 1997 article, Peter Beaumont presented the 1994 Treaty as favoring Israel almost solely, to the extent that Jordan’s support of the program seems ridiculous to the point of irrationality and impossibility. Beaumont argues that Jordan is gaining much less water under the 1994 Treaty than it would have under the Johnston Plan created in the 1950s. He concludes that it is “remarkable that Jordan should have signed such a deal” . And while he acknowledges that the water sections of the treaty are only part of a larger agreement, Beaumont fails to convincingly state that Jordan did gain from the other sections. Failing to do this has resulted in an article that makes Jordan seem like an irrational puppet without agency.
The Treaty states “The Parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international co-operation.” Some academics see this clause as greatly beneficial to Israel, even to the extent of ignoring any possible benefits from it for Jordan . This is greatly problematic, in that it portrays Jordan as an actor able to be “shoved around” by Israel. This line of thinking also fails to see the many ways that international cooperation is important for Jordan as well. It was hoped that Jordan’s treaty would lead to Israeli peace agreements with several other Arab states, furthering water negotiations . In this line of reasoning, Jordan needed Israel to join in as well due to the reality of geography and physicality of water resources.
At the time of treaty’s signing (and, arguably, today), the Arab position (in regards to Israel, regional water management, and many other issues) was greatly fragmented. Arab states did not stand unified or share policies. Elmusa argues that Arab fragmentation played a large role in Jordanian consent to the water agreements contained in the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel. Because Jordan could not count fully on Arab states to remain unified, nor did it have solid agreements and shared management with these other neighbors, the idea of segmented water management did not seem more problematic than its current reality.
Further confounding the argument that Israel gained more from the 1994 Treaty than Jordan is the “Palestinian question.” Palestine is an important actor in all MENA region cooperation, though often an informal or less recognized one. The role (or lack thereof) of Palestine in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations is interesting to explore. Palestine, if it becomes an independent state, will likely also demand access to the waters of the Jordan. This is entirely unaddressed in the 1994 Treaty. It may be assumed that negotiations over the River Jordan and Jordan’s basin for Palestine will take place entirely with Israel, as it is “Israel’s land” that Palestine will come from. In this case, Israel may not be as great a winner in the treaty as it is sometimes portrayed, as it is expected to eventually bestow some of these gains on the new Palestinian state, while Jordan’s share will remain the same.
Political scientist Allison Astorino-Courtois explores the role of the Jordanian public in accepting the 1994 Peace Treaty. Examining the issue from a marketing perspective, Astorino-Courtois argues that the Jordanian leaders had to rely not only on popular hopes for peace, but on explicit material gains different groups could hope to achieve through the treaty process. This line of reasoning is most likely to point to gains such as the forgiveness of foreign debt and a solution to the Palestinian refugee “problem” as benefits for various Jordanian populations. Greenwood echoes Astorino-Courtois’ argument that Jordanian political leaders needed to be careful in presenting and persuading the Jordanian public to accept the treaty, with Baylouny and Ryan also reinforcing the unpopularity of the treaty domestically. That the government was willing to sign the treaty in spite of the domestic battles such an agreement would necessitate are further evidence of the Jordanian government’s agency in accepting the Treaty.
An exploration of various legal frameworks about MENA region water resources by Bruch et al. concludes that Middle Eastern and North African countries should develop their legal frameworks further in order to properly care for and benefit from their scarce resources. Though one may argue that the 1994 Treaty favored Israel more than Jordan, it also provided the first legal agreement between the two countries about water usage. This gave Jordan a base from which to build further agreements and a place from which to argue about treaty violations. Thus, though it may have been less-than-ideal progress, arguably made Jordan better off than the pre-Treaty reality.
A 2008 article by Israeli scholar Itay Fischhendler argues that ambiguity in treaties can be even more destructive than if an agreement did not exist. For Fischhendler, a base from which to build further agreements is not necessarily better than the status quo. Vagueness in treaties may result in contradictory policies and claims. People and organizations may believe that the resources are being managed and regulated when, in fact, they are being mismanaged more greatly than they were prior to the agreement. But Fischhendler points to the fact that ambiguity can be a political necessity. The question then arises whether or not this ambiguity is more destructive than it is worth. The answer to this issue depends upon the other benefits gained from the agreement.
Haddadin (2002) provides a glimpse into the negotiations themselves. His presentation of the agreement processes themselves indicate that Jordan brought a good number of ideas to the table; these goals were “sacrificed” for other benefits. Again, we see Jordanian negotiators presented as rational actors with choices, who determined that giving on issues of water was acceptable to gain on others.
What were these others? Western scholars tend to emphasize the role of the United States in helping to persuade Jordan. Moore demonstrates that the United States began encouraging greater regional trade immediately after the treaty’s signing, which would aid each of the states involved along with the US. US President Bill Clinton promised to forgive Jordanian debt if a peace agreement was reached. In addition to these immediate gains, Jordan has continued reaping the benefits of the United States’ favor, as discussed by Schwedler and Naiman.

The Middle East Peace Process: A Brief Overview
On October 26, 1994, King Hussein of Jordan and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel signed the “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” hereafter known as the “Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace” or simply “Peace Treaty.” The treaty’s ratification ended a state of war between the two countries that had existed for nearly half a century since 1948. By signing the treaty, Jordan became the second Arab country to regulate and legitimize relations with Israel (the first was Egypt).
Though a state of war technically existed between the two countries since Israel’s inception, relations were not greatly hostile at all times; indeed, several scholars have written on cooperative (though sometimes clandestine) communications between the states even during armed conflict . King Hussein met with Israeli leadership fairly frequently; sometimes openly and occasionally more secretively. There were, however, periods of intense violence. Jordan participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, protesting the state’s existence. In 1967, Israel fought against an allied Egypt and Jordan; this conflict cost Jordan East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Jordan lost territory, some control over a major water resource, and a critical portion of its economy.
In 1987, Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein met in London for several hours. Their discussion led to an agreement outlining an international conference, to be hosted by the United Nations, meant to help bring about Arab-Israeli peace. Though Peres went to the meeting with the permission of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, he feared that Shamir would not back the agreement. Mistrust and the failure of the Israeli Cabinet to approve the agreement caused Shamir to block the peace conference . Hussein, discouraged, backed away from further peace initiatives for several years. But in July 1988, he relinquished sovereignty over the West Bank , hoping to respect the PLO-Israeli peace process and Palestinian state sovereignty. “These steps were taken only in response to the wish of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the prevailing Arab conviction that such measures will contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people and their glorious uprising” . October 1991 saw an international peace conference in Madrid.
From this conference came the well-known Oslo Accords, signed on September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C., and generating the famous photo of Arafat and Rabin’s handshake. When the Oslo Accords were ratified, indicating the beginning of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, increased pressure was placed on Jordan to get on board.
July 25, 1994, Rabin and Hussein signed the “Washington Declaration,” overseen by US President Bill Clinton. The state of war was officially ended. Negotiations for a full treaty were begun. The treaty was signed on October 26, 1994, in Israel’s Arava Valley by Prime Ministers Rabin and al-Majali; President Weizman and King Hussein shook hands. The Oslo Accords, and the United States’ well-publicized promotion of regional peace efforts, played a critical role in allowing the peace treaty to go forward in 1994. The Oslo Accords had indicated that a resolution to the “Palestinian question” was in sight; it was time for Jordan to acknowledge and help further this reconciliation process. The US’ desperate desire for a peaceful Middle East gave Jordan the opportunity to capitalize on potential gains from peace processes.

Findings
Content of the Treaty
The 1994 Treaty explored several issues, focusing on borders, normalization, security, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee situation, and, of course, water. It is important to bear in mind that the exact future of a potential Palestinian state was not yet decided; a great deal of the peace negotiations, and the language of the treaty, “dodged” or was purposely ambiguous to allow for eventual Palestinian involvement.

Benefit 1: Peaceful Relationships
The first benefit of the 1994 Peace Treaty is the most obvious, but not one that should be ignored. In addition to a militarily peaceful relationship (i.e., a formal end to armed conflict and warfare), peaceful relations brought with them economic and political advantages. Article 5 establishes diplomatic relations between the two countries, setting up resident ambassadors and agreeing that “the normal relationship between [Israel and Jordan] will include economic and cultural relations” . Other portions of the Treaty discuss tourist visas, open travel possibilities, and create a free trade zone. Additionally, the parties agreed to cooperate against “terrorism of all kinds,” also working together to prevent attacks and smuggling while promising not to enter the other’s territory without permission . Israel’s technological advancement was of no mean importance, either. Through the Treaty, Jordan obtained a fairly developed country as a partner in water research and acquisition. Jordan, as a friend (or, at least, not an explicit enemy) of Israel, benefits from Israel’s technology and knowledge.

Benefit 2: Forgiveness of US Debt
Not all of the benefits gained from the 1994 Peace Process were a part of the treaty itself. Then president of the United States Bill Clinton promised to forgive Jordanian debt if Hussein entered into successful peace negotiations. In addition to this debt cancellation, Hussein could expect increased aid and investment from the West after achieving peace with Israel, both because of Israel’s positive relationship with Western nations and the proof that it could cooperate with its neighbors. If Jordan proved itself to America, it would win an important ally in working with the states of the Persian Gulf, with whom Hussein hoped to reestablish economic and political relations . The hoped-for influence over and from America has proven true, as discussed by Schwedler and Naiman.

Benefit 3: A Step forward for Palestinians
In the light of the Oslo Accords, Jordan may well have hoped to win both Israel’s and the emerging Palestine’s favor by agreeing to a peace process that benefitted Israel while not granting it full autonomy. By insisting on several ambiguities and “to be determined” clauses, Jordan saw itself as helping to pave the way for a Palestinian state. It won support for the peace process from several constituencies in the process, both those who hoped for autonomy for Palestine and those who wanted the Palestinians to no longer be Jordan’s problem. By forcing Israel to claim some responsibility for the Palestinian refugees, Jordan won legitimacy in taking action against being the sole supporter of Palestinian people and perpetually facing the burdens it felt this group placed on its country.
That being said, the only time the word “Palestine” or “Palestinian” occurs explicitly in the text of the Treaty is in Article 8, which discusses refugees. The two countries state the need for a four-way committee (including Egypt and the Palestinians) to work toward refugee solutions. The role of Middle Eastern conflict is said to have created a great many refugees; it is not explicitly acknowledged that the refugees are mainly Palestinian.

Benefit 4: Water and Land
The Jordan River was named the Israeli-Jordanian border in Article 3, and it was agreed that the border would move according to any changing flow of the water. Jordan gained three hundred square kilometers in the deal. A border segment between Ein Gedi and Beit She’an was not demarcated; Jordan insisted the Palestinian Authority must be a part of that process.
Jerusalem was not discussed very explicitly in the 1994 Treaty; instead, Israel recognizes Jordan’s special relationship with Muslim holy sites in the City. The language states that Israel will grant “high priority” to Jordan’s “historic role” at these shrines during final status negotiations (it is implied that these negotiations would take place primarily with the Palestinian Authority rather than Jordan).
The word “water” is one of the most often-occurring words in the Treaty; appearing almost thirty times. An entire article (6) and an annex (II) are given to the issue. Each year, Jordan will get fifty million cubic meters (50,000,000 m3) of water (developed jointly with Israel), and Jordan owns seventy-five percent (75%) of the Yarmouk River’s water. Both parties were permitted to develop alternate water resources and reservoirs, acknowledging that “their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs” .
Though Jordan may not have “won” the water issue during the 1994 Treaty in terms of beating (=gaining more than) Israel, this does not mean the Treaty was unfavorable to it. Though Jordan did not acquire as much land or water as it had prior to Israel’s creation, it regained some of what had been taken militarily by Israel in armed conflict, land that it could not have hoped to gain back with military might.

Conclusion
King Hussein was also willing to give a little on the issue of water resources to gain other benefits from the treaty’s incorporation. Hussein’s hopes for peace are well accounted for by his desire for improved relations with the West and the region. The rest of Jordan, however, is a different story. Islamist and leftist politicians were unlikely to agree with the peace process or support it publically. Though Jordan’s Parliament is not sufficiently powerful to block Hussein’s involvement in the peace process, they could have discredited the King’s policies very publically, and a formal peace treaty could have been blocked by the Lower House. This barrier was overcome by a 1993 electoral law that gave Transjordanians enhanced political representation. This constituency in turn provided Hussein’s administration with a loyal base and a Parliament that would agree to peace processes.
Jordanians were clearly aware that they would not be able to beat Israel militarily; this no doubt increased their willingness to negotiate. But it also made them hesitant to open up borders too much: “The Israelis are much stronger than us and they will eat up our country. They will influence our culture and dominate our fragile economy”, worried a young plumber in Amman . Domestically, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ali Abu Raghib, asserted that “the success of the peace treaty hinges totally on the success of [economic] development efforts” . Hussein, along with the 1993 electoral law, also introduced certain economic policies (including the successful implementation of economic liberalization and IMF support). Additionally, he could promise enhanced economic relations with several thriving countries and benefits to all Jordanians as a result of the peace treaty.
As seen in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Process, the states of the Middle East and North Africa will not be easily forced into peaceful conditions. The region is one of sovereign states and an authority recognized by most of the world as legitimate; these entities will not easily give into other countries’ demands unless they feel they are acquiring a great deal in the process. Negotiations must include frank assessment of power relationships and assets held by actors. Powerful countries such as the US can aid the peace process by increasing countries’ incentives (as President Bill Clinton did by promising debt relief for Jordan).
Water has and will continue to be a major component of both tense relations and peace agreements. Water Wars need not occur if natural resources can be incorporated into existing and future treaties such that all actors feel they have been fairly treated and no population’s water needs are ignored.
The 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stands as an example of what negotiations can be between conflicting states and how water resources can be successfully compromised over, even when resources are tight and relationships tense.
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More on the Recent Protests

This paper is significantly more coherent and discusses the role of food prices in the recent unrest. Also shorter!
: )

The Role of Food Prices in the 2010-2011 African Uprisings


The much-lauded revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt dominated Western media for several months. Indeed, it was not until a massive earthquake hit Japan that Tunisia was kicked off the front page.
International news sources have highlighted the peaceful nature of these movements, protestors’ anger over governmental corruption, and the people’s push for democracy. But when the protests first began, before they became grandiose movements, before Ben Ali and Mubarak were overthrown and the events labeled as “revolutions,” food prices were named as the primary cause of the unrest.
This paper will explore the role of food and commodity prices in the 2010-2011 African unrest. It will begin with a literature review discussing the theoretical relationships between food security, violence, and unrest. The practical applications of these theoretical understandings will then be considered, using the 2010-2011 events as case studies. Possible comparisons to the African food riots of the 1970s will also be reviewed. The paper will argue that food prices played a larger role in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions than Western media has credited. This conclusion allows for greater similarities between the politico-economic unrest in North Africa and the emerging protests and riots in sub-Saharan Africa than currently acknowledged.

Food Security and the State: Food Prices, Violence, and Stability
In the Middle East, numerous diplomats and academics (including UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and journalists John Bulloch and Adel Darwish) have predicted a “Water War,” in which states will clash over water tensions. In Africa, conflicts seem to occur over food security concerns. Food and water security are inevitably bound together. Without meeting one, meeting the other becomes virtually pointless. One must be water secure to be food secure; low levels of food security put a person at greater risk for waterborne disease. Food security is not simply the meeting of a human body’s biological caloric requirement, but the freedom people have in knowing that they will at all times “have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” . In times and places when a population is both food and water insecure and more than half their water goes to food, it often means people are deciding between giving a sick child a drink and having another meager meal.
Hungry, thirsty people are angry people. Both North and sub-Saharan Africa are regions wrought with conflict and tension. Without adequate food and water security, we create additional motivations for unrest . Food and water security is a critical part of military security and political stability. Norman Borlaug, father of the Green Revolution, asserted “You cannot have political stability based on empty stomachs and poverty. When I see food lines in developing countries, I know that those governments are under pressure and are in danger of falling.” His words were shown to be true in the 1970s as high food prices and hunger contributed to the fall of the Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Thai governments , and now again as they have helped to topple Ben Ali and Mubarak.
Though hunger may not always cause the complete collapse of governments or full-on revolutions, “Where there is hunger there is no hope. There is only desolation and pain. Hunger nurtures violence and fanaticism. A world where people starve will never be safe.” These words, spoken by Lula, a former president of Brazil, have been true for centuries. Food riots broke out in the US during the Great Depression; in the 1970s, food riots in Bangladesh and India became routine. Scholars believe that hunger will and has contributed to the rise of terrorism , in Africa and elsewhere. Amilcar Cabral, leader of Guinea-Bissau’s independence movement, said “Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone’s head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children…” Many terrorists are not truly fighting for ideologies but out of economic frustration. Nobel prize-winner Paul Krugman has acknowledged the role of today’s food prices in the recent violence, calling “sky-high food prices” “an important trigger for popular rage” .
But environmentalist authors Evan Fraser and Andrew Rimas argue that food riots alone are not enough. In an article exploring the psychology of food riots, they point out that violence does not inevitably occur with changing or increasing prices (indeed, food prices have skyrocketed and availability plummeted plenty of times historically without accompanying food riots). Rather, violence over food prices happens when combined with a popular sense of being cheated, of injustice . This argument can help to explain why anger over food prices combined with an ideology (be it religious or political) can produce such a violent result. The ideology becomes the vehicle through which the injustice, and thus the cause of hunger, is understood.
The food protests in Africa today have not become terrorist organizations; instead, they morphed into democratic movements. Democracy is, in its way, just as much an ideology as terrorism or fundamentalism, albeit generally a more positive one. Recent events have demonstrated that the same logic that leads food riots into becoming terrorist movements can instead create pro-democracy movements from hunger with the right political conditions and factors on the ground. Amartya Sen argues that famines do not occur in democracies as the government becomes accountable to the people for distribution . As Africans become more educated and see the control their governments have over food prices and policies, they are able to blame the government increasingly for issues of hunger, unemployment, and other economic woes. If this causal chain is seen, food protests can rationally become democratic movements rather than riots and terrorist organizations. This recently played out in North Africa, as will be demonstrated below.

The 2010-2011 African Uprisings
Organizers of civil movements in North Africa report that discussions and planning has been occurring for months, and no one will dispute that there have been quiet grumblings in select circles against corrupt leaders and strict regimes for years. But the start date generally given to the recent series of events is December 18, 2010, the day Mohamed Bouazizi, a street produce vendor, set himself on fire . The self-immolation struck a chord for many Tunisians, and the action began. On January 14, 2011, African protestors saw their first major victory as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, one of Africa’s infamous Big Men (a term given to African dictators, most of whom have been in power since independence and were placed there and continually supported by Western powers), stepped down and fled the country .
Since Ben Ali left power, Egypt’s Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak has also been ousted . Civil unrest and “copycat” uprisings have spread across North Africa and into the Middle East and central Asia, from Iran to Mauritania. Libya has seen protests since February 15, 2011, and is now in a state of serious armed conflict, debatably termed a civil war. Major protests in Algeria began on December 28 and won the end of Algeria’s nineteen-year-old state of emergency. Minor protests have also been seen in Djibouti, Morocco, North and South Sudan, and Western Sahara. Events in these countries are often grouped as part of the “MENA region uprisings,” but protests based on similar complaints have been seen throughout most of Africa, including in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Swaziland, and Uganda.

“Copycat” Revolutions?
The word “copycat” was seen frequently in international media as the unrest seemed to “spread” from Tunisia across the region . And though certain techniques were borrowed or imitated (most noticeably the self-immolation, which had been proven successful in gaining great international attention), it is vital that the uprisings not be viewed as a homogenous group. For too long, Africa has been seen as a homogeneous “country,” not a continent with many heterogeneous states. The uprisings across Africa and the Middle East share some similar causes: hunger, poverty and economic woes, anger at governmental corruption and human rights abuses. But these no more make the protests in Tunisia and Djibouti identical than the American and French Revolutions. In an attempt to avoid further homogenization, several movements will be discussed independently. The paper will then turn to some conclusions that can be drawn based on the protests’ similarities and differences.

Tunisia
The basic facts of Tunisia’s revolution have already been presented. For the purposes of this paper, Tunisia and Egypt will be identified as “revolutions” because they have overthrown a specific government and institutional changes are in progress. It is important to note that this is not an uncontested term.
Several causal factors have been cited as motivations for the unrest. For Bouazizi, the most direct were unemployment and food inflation. Tunisia’s well-educated citizenry has faced a 13-15% unemployment rate for the last decade and high labor market rigidity . Unaffordable food prices drew even greater attention to the country’s extreme inequality. Bouazizi, the first self-immolator, was an educated but unemployed individual. Police confiscated his wares, fruits and vegetables, for selling without a permit. Hunger and economic frustration led to the desperate act that “started it all.” Eventually, people and organizations began to rally around the greater issues of corruption and political freedoms as well .
Tunisia’s revolution is now described in the media as one focused on democracy, a fight against corruption and underrepresentation. But at the very beginning, news sources reported on the unrest over food prices, not political freedoms. Food prices were clearly seen as the main issue by the government; Ben Ali promised on national television to lower food prices in an attempt to calm the storm .

Egypt
Egypt, the only other country that has had an official change in leadership as a result of the 2010-2011 actions, began publically with the January 25 Revolution. Protestors, through a series of marches and mainly nonviolent civil resistance techniques (including demonstrations and labor strikes), demanded the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. They won it February 11 . Egyptian protestors suffered from complaints of food price inflation, unemployment, and low wages; however, the protests have been portrayed as mainly political . The events of Tahrir Square have captured the hearts and imaginations of the Western people and international media. Egypt’s protests became purely about democracy and political freedom for most academics and news sources. There are, however, a few sources that have acknowledged the role of food prices, most notably NPR, reporting the ideas of New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubini .

Kenya
Protests in Kenya have been focused on commodity prices , particularly maize. The Kenyan government recently reduced the tax on fuel, but citizens are protesting the cuts were not large enough. Protestor Yash Pal Ghai, an expert in constitutional law, cited both prices and corruption as causal factors for the protests. Pal Ghai says that the irony and inappropriateness of luxury cars driven by politicians traveling to debate rising food prices is not lost on the starving Kenyan public. “It is amazing there has not been a rebellion by now” . Economists warn that if rising prices are not slowed soon, inflation will hit double digits .

Uganda
Like Kenya, Uganda has seen protests primarily over food and commodity prices . The media does not present the Ugandan protests as democratic, even though two opposing presidential candidates have been arrested. Instead, a news article details the increase in commodity prices, citing the fact that “staples such as soap, rice, and cooking oil have gone up by more than 40 percent since the beginning of the year” . Instead of highlighting the political nature of the protests, articles discussed “walk to work” protests, pushing back against rising fuel prices .

The 1970s Food Riots
In 1972, bad weather across the globe (harsh winters, droughts, typhoons, and changing ocean currents) drastically reduced production while population – and therefore demand – was soaring. The year’s harvest was 3% short of supplying demand and world reserves hit a twenty-two year low . Famine hit the globe. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, an estimated ten thousand people died each week in 1974 .
People rioted around the globe. Violence and unrest ruled. Instead of organized protests demonstrating specifically against the government, most of the unrest occurred between people, physically fighting over resources to survive.

Conclusions
The way the international media portrays the recent events in Africa, protests in Kenya and Uganda seem more like the 1970s food riots than the movements in Tunisia and Egypt. That movements in the North African countries (those viewed by the West as “Arab” and belonging more to the Middle East than to Africa) were portrayed as pro-democracy and anti-corruption, while protests in sub-Saharan countries have been depicted and interpreted as unorganized complaints over food prices, which furthers the false dichotomy created by Westerners between the “Arab” and “African” worlds. The language further patronizes the abilities and agency of Africans. That the Tunisian and Egyptian protests have been titled the “Twitter Revolutions” gives credit to Western technologies for the spread of democracy rather than the Arab people themselves.
This is not to say that information technology has not played a large role in all of the movements. Proponents of IT aid to developing countries cheer at this demonstration of its power; cynics criticize Western media for crediting Western technologies with the spread of democracy rather than the African people themselves. Both positions are probably too extreme. The protestors themselves have repeatedly highlighted the important role of technology in organizing the activities and mobilizing support. Through increased access to mobile phones and media sources, people across Africa have been able to follow the events in Tunisia and Egypt. The fact that protestors in sub-Saharan Africa nickname their protests “Tahrir” indicates the inspiration seemingly successful movements have had. Websites have aided organizers in making their activities and demands public. But it is important to note that information technologies have played a facilitative, not originating, role in each of these movements. Facebook did not cause the unrest in Tunisia anymore than the English cannon caused the Hundred Years’ War.
There has traditionally been a division in Western understandings of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and those of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): problems in MENA are governmental and military; SSA’s issues are about poverty and hunger. The dichotomy created by international media as they have portrayed the recent events further buys into this division. But food and water security are a massive problem in the Middle East and North Africa, and corruption and anti-democratic systems have tremendous negative effects on sub-Saharan Africa. By characterizing the MENA protests as about democracy and the SSA protests as about food and poverty, the international media has missed a potential opportunity to reverse this harmful dichotomy. The MENA protests could have been used as a chance to encourage international aid to focus on food security in the region and international organizations to help Africa develop stronger democratic systems. Instead, the media has taken the easy way out and continued furthering misconceptions and a harmful, patronizing dichotomy.
There is a great deal of similarity between the events in North and sub-Saharan Africa, much more than allowed by the international media. The way in which the protests have been reported is biased and problematic, furthering Western misconceptions about both regions. If there is one thing we should learn from the 2010-2011 uprisings, it is that the people of Africa – all of Africa – are ready to take on responsibility for their own lives. In fact, they demand it.


References
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Dinner at Red Lobster - with Papa!

A group of friends and I planned to go out to eat on Friday night prior to the last Spartan Dischords (a capella group) concert of the year. And, surprise surprise, Papa was able to join us! That was fun. He came into town for a friend's Art Show Opening, which I was bummed to miss. But I'm sure it was brilliant!
: )

Protests in Africa

Many have been asking me about my take on the recent string of protests in the Middle East. Here's a long discussion about the role of Islam in protests, which are spreading to much of sub-Saharan Africa as well.

Islam and the State: The Role of Islam in 2010-2011 African Uprisings

March 11, 2011, an earthquake hit Tōhoku, Japan. It became the main story for most Western media outlets, dislodging what had been on the front page for several months prior: Tunisia.
Tunisia experienced heavy civil unrest beginning in December 2010. By January 2011, President Ben Ali was ousted from rule. 2011 saw a string of so-called “copycat” uprisings across North Africa and into the Middle East and central Asia, from Iran to Mauritania. Unrest is even now being seen increasingly in sub-Saharan Africa as well. This series of uprisings, riots, and civil movements has drawn a great deal of attention from Western media and academia. The events raise questions about the region’s future, the role of social media in movements, and the relationship between Islam and democracy. This paper will explore the role of Islam in the recent unrest seen mainly in North Africa. The causal levers, makeup of the various events, and their aftermaths will be discussed. The paper will begin with a literature review addressing questions of Islam and the state, exploring issues of democracy, terrorism, and Muslim political parties and governments. It will then present a brief overview of the events in Africa since December 2010. What has happened, and the way it was presented in international media, will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to the actual and perceived role of Islam in these events. The paper will conclude with a discussion about possible future directions for Islam in the region.

Islam and the State
The West is home to many ill-conceived misunderstandings about Islam. Many of these revolve around the relationship between Islam and the state. Islam existing in a “secular state” has come to be oxymoronic for Westerners who only know of Islam as a repressive religion enforcing women’s oppression and demanding hardliner Shari’a law in state government. It is thought that Islam and democracy are “not compatible,” and many academics and political commentators acknowledge the widely-believed myth that Arab and African people are too “immature” for democracy . The reality is not so clear-cut.
Ottaway and Carothers acknowledge that “the region appears to repel democracy.” In 2004, they argued that change would come not from liberal Arab activists and Westerners, but from the Islamist parties. Here, a word must be said about the confusion between “Islamist” and “fundamentalist” groups. The terms are not clear-cut or well defined in academic or media discourse. Abootalebi provides a discussion about the two, asserting that the Iranian revolution may have helped to shape the distinction. “Fundamentalist” Islam refers to the more traditional views whose supporters claim sole authority to properly interpret religious texts. In religious studies, “fundamentalists” are generally those members of a religion who focus on the texts themselves. Fundamentalists are generally not politically active, instead centering their attention on family life and personal piety. Since 9/11, however, the term “fundamentalism” has come to seem synonymous with Islam-based terrorism. The media is not clear about its use of the term. Further confusing the discussion is the emergence of the term “Islamism,” which generally refers to political action with Islam at its center. Abootalebi argues that Islamism, unlike traditional fundamentalism, can incorporate the idea that Islamic tenets can coexist with democracy. But so-called “Islamist” parties are often equated by Western media with terrorist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt with branches in many African and Middle Eastern countries, is often depicted as in cahoots with al Qaeda and other fundamentalist, terrorist organizations.
Anthropologists and comparative political scientists have been fighting the myth of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy for some time now. Nor is it only liberal academics who believe the two can coexist. In a 2002 article, Mark Tessler presents information about individual interviews conducted with people in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine. He asserts that “Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic society” and that issues of personal piety generally did not affect notions of democracy, especially for male respondents. Robert Hefner, professor of anthropology at Boston University, writes extensively on Islamic and Qur’anic schooling, and has also published on the relationship between Islam and the state. In an essay written reflecting on Islam since September 11th, Hefner points out that the acts of terrorism performed that day were not only against the West, but also against liberal, democratically-minded Muslims . The debate on Islam’s compatibility with democracy, Hefner points out, is not a clash of Arab vs. West, but of Muslim vs. Muslim, a question of internal religious interpretation. These questions have many parallels with the democratization of Christianity seen in Western history.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, has been arguing for the compatibility of Islam and democracy for more than two decades. He sees his faith as consistent with democracy and freedom and argues for the right of Muslims to dissent against mainstream religious opinion without fear .
Though the West tends to portray Arab and African states as anti-democratic, and thus Islam as anti-democratic. But there currently exists a multitude of states and systems that have successfully navigated Islam and democracy in the same space. The world’s largest Muslim nation is not in the Middle East, nor is it an Arab state. Robert Hefner’s Civil Islam explores the processes of democratization in Indonesia. In the midst of violence in the 1960s, an Islamic movement for democracy emerged. The religion played a vital role in the violent regime’s overthrow. Today, Indonesia serves as an example of a state that is simultaneously Muslim, democratic, and pro-women’s rights. Malaysia and Turkey as well serve as counter-examples to the claim that a “Muslim democracy” is not possible.
Anthropological arguments serve a key role in these discussions. The anthropology of religion is perhaps one of the most relevant academic disciplines in questions of the relationship between Islam and the state, as the anthropology of religion explores the connections between religion and society, studying how religious movements and ideologies affect cultural values and vice versa. Anthropological arguments can help to explain the multiplicity of interpretations found in the diverse world of Islam, highlighting where and how Islam is used to support democracy.

Overview of Events
Organizers of civil movements in North Africa report that discussions and planning has been occurring for months, and no one will dispute that there have been quiet grumblings in select circles against corrupt leaders and strict regimes for years. But the start date generally given to the recent series of events is December 18, 2010, the day that Mohamed Bouazizi, a street produce vendor, set himself on fire . The self-immolation struck a chord for many Tunisians, and the action began. On January 14, 2011, African protestors saw their first major victory as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, one of African’s infamous Big Men (a term given to African dictators, most of whom have been in power since independence and were placed there and continually supported by Western powers), stepped down and fled the country .
Since Ben Ali left power, Egypt’s Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak was also ousted . Libya has seen protests since February 15, 2011, and is now in a state of serious armed conflict, debatably termed a civil war. Major protests in Algeria began on December 28 and won the end of Algeria’s nineteen-year-old state of emergency. Minor protests have also been seen in Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, North and South Sudan, and Western Sahara. Protests in these countries are often grouped as part of the “MENA region uprisings,” but protests based on similar complaints have been seen throughout most of Africa, including in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Swaziland, and Uganda.

“Copycat” Revolutions?
The word “copycat” was seen frequently in media as the unrest seemed to “spread” from Tunisia across the region . And though certain techniques were borrowed or imitated (most noticeably the self-immolation, which had been proven successful in gaining great international attention), it is vital that the uprisings not be viewed as a homogenous group. For too long, Africa and Islam have been treated as homogenous entities, the great diversity between and within African countries ignored and the variety of Islamic interpretations disregarded. The uprisings across Africa and the Middle East share some similar causes: poverty and economic woes, anger at governmental corruption and human rights abuses. But these no more make the protests in Tunisia and Djibouti identical than the American and French Revolutions. In an attempt to avoid further homogenization, each of the movements will be discussed independently. Attention will be focused on motivations and methods of each movement with particular emphasis given to the role of Islam where applicable.

Tunisia
The basic facts of Tunisia’s revolution have already been presented. (For the purposes of this paper, Tunisia and Egypt will be identified as “revolutions” because they have overthrown a specific government and institutional changes are in progress. It is important to note that this is not an uncontested term.)
Several causal factors have been cited as motivations for the unrest. For Bouazizi, the most direct were unemployment and food inflation. Tunisia’s well-educated citizenry has faced a 13-15% unemployment rate for the last decade and high labor market rigidity . Unaffordable food prices drew even greater attention to the country’s extreme inequality. People and organizations began to rally around the greater issues of corruption and political freedoms as well .
Tunisia’s revolution was politico-economic. “[M]en and women marched side by side, holding hands and chanting together in the name of civil rights, not Islam” . But this is not to say that religion was absent from the events. Tunisia is a predominately Muslim country. The state religion is Islam and the President must be Muslim, but freedom of religion is enshrined in the Constitution and the culture is fairly secular. Muslims were involved in the revolution (on both sides), and mosques were used as rallying points – but not a rallying cry. Tunisia’s was not an Islamic revolution. That being said, Islam remains a strong actor in social life. The main Muslim movement (Ennahdha, “Renaissance”), banned under the dictatorship, is reorganizing. Some indications of fundamentalism have been seen since Ben Ali’s resignation (in Tunis, security forces were called in to protect brothels from zealot mobs ), but Islamic law does not seem likely; even Ennahdha opposes it, hoping instead that Tunisia will adopt a model like Turkey or Malaysia’s. Historian Amy Kallander believes that the possibility of an Islamist resurgence in Tunisia is vastly overdone in international media; however, at the time she wrote this article, Rashid al-Ghannoushi (a founder of Ennahdha) was still in exile . Al-Ghannoushi was able to return on January 30, four days after Kallander’s piece was published . For some, al-Ghannoushi’s return signals the true end to Tunisia’s one-party ruler; others can read the events as a validation of concerns over increasing fundamentalism in Tunisia.

Egypt
Egypt, the only other country that has had an official change in leadership as a result of the 2010-2011 actions, began publically with the January 25 Revolution. Protestors, through a series of marches and mainly nonviolent civil resistance techniques (including demonstrations and labor strikes), demanded the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. They won it February 11 . Egyptian protestors suffered from complaints of food price inflation, unemployment, and low wages; however, the protests were mainly political .
Islam is the state religion of Egypt and the majority of the population are Sunni Muslims. Though there is some lip service given to religious freedom, the government has placed restrictions on this freedom. Religious minorities, particularly Jews, can face high formal and informal barriers to employment and equality. Islamic political activism is strong. Egypt is home to the well-known Society of the Muslim Brothers (“the Muslim Brotherhood”), which espouses the idea that “Islam is the solution.” The Muslim Brotherhood was not a major actor in the revolution itself, nor was the revolution an Islamic one . But post-Mubarak, people are beginning to wonder just how revolutionary the “revolution” truly was, as the Supreme Council continues to enact laws, and how democratic Egypt will remain, “as the Islamist trends continue to expand their political influence” . The Muslim Brotherhood, unlike many more liberal parties, has remained organized during Mubarak’s years. Though it did not participate in the revolution itself, it was in a strong place to take action after Mubarak fell . Political analysts worried that, were elections to be held too soon, a victory would essentially be handed to the Brotherhood, thanks to their organization. The party insists, however, that they “want to participate, not to dominate” arguing that “Secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy” . The extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood will be involved in Egyptian politics remains to be seen, as does Islam’s future in regards to the state.

Libya
Perhaps the greatest unknown at the time this paper is being written lies with Libya. The uncertainty is reflected in the language used by international media. Are the events a revolutionary attempt, a rebellion, or a civil war?
Libya’s protests started out in much the same way as Tunisia and Egypt’s, with peaceful protests on the streets. But Colonel Muammar Muhammad al-Gaddafi did not respond peacefully; protestors have faced violent responses from the government since February 15 . The protests are now organized and well run. An Interim Transitional National Council has formed and released an eight-point plan for a democratic Libya . The main motivation for Libyan rebels is now democratic elections. Thanks to Libya’s oil wealth and relative small population, the country has fared well in economic and political development. But its corruption index is worse than both Tunisia and Egypt , and oil riches have not been shared equally. Nor has the country always been unified. The East, main home of the current rebellion, was separated from the West under Roman rule, and the monarch who was overthrown by Gaddafi hailed from the East. Gaddafi’s general mistreatment of his eastern citizens did not help ease tensions along the fault line .
As with Tunisia and Egypt, protests have been mainly focused on issues of democracy and freedom. Islam, though, too, is a major tension. Libya is a devoutly Muslim country, and Gaddafi is far from devout. Muslim protestors point out that Gaddafi has degraded holy scriptures, shut down Qur’anic schools, and replaced the Islamic lunar calendar. Most of the country’s religious leaders have urged Muslims to support the rebellion, going so far as to release a fatwa (religious opinion) . Gaddafi’s government has accused the rebels of including al-Qaeda members; the rebels – many of whom are civilians (teachers, lawyers, students) – deny it . NATO’s commander Stavridis has acknowledged that ‘flickers’ of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah presence have been seen, but the extent is unclear .

Algeria
December 2010 saw protests in Algeria over housing and employment concerns . Protests continued over these issues as well as anger over food prices, corruption, and constraints on freedom of speech. Protests were illegal without government permission during the nineteen-year state of emergency. In late February, the government finally agreed to lift the state of emergency, allowing for greater individual and group freedoms for Algerians . Few protests pushed for the actual resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika; he stated on April 15 that he would seek to “reinforce representative democracy” through constitutional amendments . Economic woes and protests continue.
The state of emergency was instilled after a military coup d’état overthrew the Islamic Salvation Front, after the FIS gained victory in Algeria’s first free parliamentary election . In Algeria, then, we see lesser democracy and political freedoms granted in the name of preventing Islamic fundamentalism from gaining ground. The Islamic parties that continued in Algerian coalition during the state of emergency were essentially “neutered” by the government, as they made compromises to remain in power and lost their support base as they became less fundamentalist . Lifting the state of emergency could thus be a hindrance or a help to Algeria’s Islamic parties.

Angola
Luanda, the capital city of Angola, saw a demonstration in its Independence Square in early March. The internet was used; a website was created a few weeks prior to the physical revolution calling for President José Eduardo dos Santos’ 32-year rule to end . And though Angola’s Constitution, revised in January 2010, gives citizens the right to peacefully protest, the government arrested seventeen individuals and explicitly stated that they would squash future demonstrators . Opposition parties in the country have not participated in the protests; many leaders believe the time is not yet fully ripe. People are also suspicious of the revolution movement: The organizers of the website and protest are anonymous. Islam is a minority religion in Angola; no strong statement about the regime or the protests from Muslim leaders have reached the international stage thus far.

Benin
An election was held in Benin on March 13; President Boni Yayi claimed reelection but opponent Adrien Houngbedji claimed he had won. Youth protests in support of Houngbedji have been broken up by police . Labor union leaders are complaining that many were left out of polling . As with the Ivory Coast, Benin’s protests seem to be almost entirely political; religion has not entered the conversation explicitly.

Côte d’Ivoire
The Ivory Coast has been well-known in international media thanks to President Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to step down even after the apparent loss of elections. Gbagbo held a swearing in ceremony while protestors clamored for Ouattara to be given power . March 2011 saw the killing of several protestors, including women, as they continued to struggle for Gbagbo to leave . For months, he refused to concede the election and step down, despite domestic and international pressure. Côte d’Ivoire stands out from the other countries mentioned here in the direct involvement of external powers in the results; UN and French military tools were required to physically remove him from office . In Côte d’Ivoire, the people were not struggling for the vote so much as the enforcement of that vote; the appararent need for external forces does not bode well for the future of democracy.
There is a strong presense of Islam in the Ivory Coast, but it does not strongly dominate other religions. Religious tolerance is a key characteristic of political climate, particularly cooperation between Muslims and Christians. Islam does not seem to have played a large role in the recent presidential upheaval.

Djibouti
In 2010, President Ismail Omar Guelleh altered the Djiboutian constitution, allowing him to run for a third six-year term as president in the April 2011 elections. Djiboutian protests have focused mainly on protesting this action, pressuring Guelleh to step down. Protest actions on January 28 were responded to with violence by the Djiboutian police force. Protests ended March 11, when a US contingent meant to oversee the elections were expelled from the country . The April 2011 elections were boycotted by the opposition, but Guelleh promised not to seek a fourth term if he won the third , as he did . Though Djibouti’s protest was not religiously-based, it is interesting to note that the first protest broke out after Friday prayer in the Muslim-majority country .

Kenya
Protests in Kenya have been focused on commodity prices , particularly maize. The Kenyan government recently reduced the tax on fuel, but citizens are protesting the cuts were not large enough. Protestor Yash Pal Ghai, an expert in constitutional law, cited both prices and corruption as causal factors for the protests. The irony and inappropriateness of luxury cars driven by politicians traveling to debate rising food prices is not lost on the starving Kenyan public .
Approximately 10% of Kenyan people are Muslim; religion was not an obvious player in the protests. Nor were politics, all that explicitly. Indeed, the protests in Kenya seem to reflect the food riots of the ‘70s more than the political revolutions of North Africa today.

Mauritania
Mauritania is an Islamic Republic whose current president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz renounces Islamic fundamentalism. Riches from gold, oil, minerals, and fish make a select few in Mauritania wealthy while the majority of the population lives off agriculture. On January 17, 2011, “Mauritania’s “Bouazizi” died as Yacoub Ould Dahoud set himself on fire. Unlike Bouazizi, Dahoud was employed and a fairly well-off businessmen. His self-immolation was well thought out as a protest against corruption and oppression .
Mauritania has had coup d’états in both 2005 and 2008; Islam does not seem to have been a primary cause for either, nor for the current protests.

Morocco
Morocco has seen protests with similar slogans to Tunisia and Egypt’s (“Down with dictatorship!,” “End the corruption!.” “We want change!”); one protestor even explicitly stated “This is our Tahrir Square” . But though corruption, unemployment, and inequality are nearly as bad or worse in Morocco as in other North African states, the majority of the Moroccan people – including the protestors – are not calling for revolution and do not wish to overthrow King Mohammed VI. Compared to Hassan II, the current king is an angel. There have been improvements in family law favoring greater gender equality and near-constant streams of slow but steady improvements. It seems that Mohammed VI is doing just enough to help the people to avoid “mutiny.” In response to protests, the king has made several public promises and recently pardoned or reduced the sentences of nearly two hundred prisoners, including Islamist political prisoners . Islamist leaders and organizations have played a visible role in the protests; most notably Adl wal Ihsan, which is currently banned from politics . Protest demands include parliamentary elections; it is possible that elections in the current political and cultural climate would result in greater representation for Islamic parties in the government.

Senegal
Senegal, a moderate Muslim democracy, has also seen self-immolation. A February 18 protestor, Oumar Boucom, carried a sign reading “Work or Die” as he burned himself at the president’s Dakar palace . Protests focus on politico-economic woes, including unhappiness over President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempted third term run. An attempted march in Dakar’s main square was planned for March 19, marking the eleventh year of Boucom’s leadership. Organizers were nicknaming the square “Tahrir” for the day .

Sudan
Sudan received a good deal of attention in international media during its referendum vote earlier this year. But in spite of the civil war and drama over the vote, the country has also seen protests over issues of prices and corruption. The youth have been heavily involved in Sudan, as they were in Tunisia and Egypt, and have drawn solidarity from those movements, chanting lines like “Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan together as one” as they protest . The Sudanese protests have been smaller scale than Tunisia and Egypt’s but well-organized; again, the use of Facebook as an organizing tool is seen . International media focused on the Sudanese protests have included some of the most explicit “copycat” and “spread” language; this is likely thanks in part to the words of the protestors themselves. That South Sudan is now emerging as a new state, indicates its distrust of governmental officials and hatred of corruption and neglect, though; one can hardly credit revolutionaries in Tunisia with giving Sudanese protestors a taste for liberty! The protests in both regions resulted in a public promise from Sudan’s current president; al-Bashir has declared he will not seek reelection in 2014 .
Surprisingly, discourse about the protests in Sudan have been virtually silent on the role of Islam, though Sudan has been the world’s only Sunni republic. This is far from the case in discussions about the civil war itself; anthropologist Sondra Hale and others have highlighted the way Islam is understood by the many actors in the conflict . Religious language has been used by the government itself; the ruling National Congress Party recently created a program of “Cyber Jihad” meant to crack down on internet-based protest organizing .

Swaziland
Swaziland is Africa’s last remaining absolute monarchy. It, too, saw protests for democracy in April 2011. The movement was quickly quieted by police . The organizers in Swaziland were primarily unions, similar to the revolutionary leaders in Tunisia and Egypt (that is, the educated middle class); however, Swazi leaders were fighting against both the monarchy and the average Swazi, who holds a great deal of reverence for the monarchy . The protest movement in Swaziland has seen virtually no positive result.

Uganda
Like Kenya, Uganda has seen protests primarily over food and commodity prices . Indicating that the protests were unlikely to be purely economic, though, is the fact that a couple of presidential candidates who did not gain victory in the February 2011 elections were arrested (Kizza Besigye and Norbert Mao) . Islam is present in Uganda but not a major player; these protests also seemed primarily political.

Western Sahara
As in Morocco, the peaceful protests in Western Sahara have been particularly conspicuous for one particular factor: they have not requested the ruling leader to step aside. Instead, protestors in Western Sahara are asking that more attention and funding is given to the Sahwari army (improved salaries, attention to martyrs’ families, etc.). In the midst of a war for recognition and independence against Morocco, protestors are also speaking out against tribalism and corruption in their government, clamoring for stronger institutions and funding oversight . Here, democracy is being demanded even from a government not even recognized internationally as a true state.
The protests in the Western Sahara can hardly be termed “copycat,” however: They began in October 2010. Academics, including Noam Chomsky, are citing these protests as the true beginning of the protest movement . Islam was not a major actor in the Western Saharan protests, nor does it play a huge role in the everyday political climate of the territory.

Conclusions
Comparing Events
It is dangerous – and unjust – “to assume that revolutions occurring simultaneously have the same root causes” . And so we must take caution in making comparisons about these revolutions, particularly as they are ongoing. Africans are not one people with identical demands; even protesting groups in a single country or movement have differing requests. With this concern in mind, it can be helpful to explore some of the similarities and differences between the movements, particularly where it is noted by the protestors themselves.
Information technology has played a large role in all of the movements. Some analysts are going so far as to dub the protests in Tunisia and Egypt the “Twitter Revolutions.” Proponents of IT aid to developing countries cheer at this demonstration of its power; cynics criticize Western media for crediting Western technologies with the spread of democracy rather than the African people themselves. Both positions are probably too extreme. The protestors themselves have repeatedly highlighted the important role of technology in organizing the activities and mobilizing support. Through increased access to mobile phones and media sources, people across Africa have been able to follow the events in Tunisia and Egypt. The fact that protestors in sub-Saharan Africa nickname their protests “Tahrir” indicates the inspiration seemingly successful movements have had. Websites have aided organizers in making their activities and demands public. But it is important to note that information technologies have played a facilitative, not originating, role in each of these movements. Facebook did not cause the unrest in Tunisia anymore than the English cannon caused the Hundred Years’ War.
In many ways, the role of IT in these movements is analogous to the role of Islam. Islam has played a large role in organizing and supporting many of the protest movements. In some countries, this role has been explicit, as Islamic parties endorsed or even led protest movements. In others, Islam has served a supportive role, with mosques providing meeting space for organizers and an ideology of equality and human rights from which the protestors built their rationale. Like IT, Islam did not cause the revolutions and uprisings.
But nor did it stand in their way. This is perhaps the greatest lesson from the 2010-2011 African uprisings in regards to the role of Islam in the state and politics. The sometimes supportive and virtually never opposing role of Islam in the recent events seems to shatter, once and for all, the uncompromising idea that Islam is entirely incompatible with democratic ideas. Indeed, the fact that those states with the most success were predominately Muslim might even be used as an argument for a statement in the opposite direction. The truth likely lies somewhere between both poles. Countries that are predominately Muslim are less likely to have strong divisions along lines of ethnicity or language. The emphasis in Islam on literacy and the Arabic language has proved of us to the uprisings, easing communication and aiding in more egalitarian participation. This is not to say that Islam should be singularly credited, but its role should not be entirely dismissed either. Islam and democracy are not antithetical systems. Islam, like any religion or ideology, can be co-opted for a variety of purposes. It can be used to oppress and to liberate, to change and to keep in place.

Future Directions for Islam and the State
The uprisings took most political analysts by surprise. Anthropologists have long been aware of opposition and the multiplicity of viewpoints in Africa and the Middle East, of course, but most did not predict strong, organized movements to emerge. In the tumult of uncertainty, academics are making predictions on the record, only to be proven wrong within twelve hours. The future of the region is unclear, as is the role of Islam in regional and state politics. I will presume to make a few general statements, however.
1. The worries over a resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism are a bit excessive.
Since Mubarak stepped down, several international media outlets and popular figures have expressed concern over the possibility of Islamic fundamentalism stepping in to fill the power vacuum. These fears seem excessive and offensive. We cannot simultaneously applaud the Tunisian and Egyptian people for their powerful, peaceful organizing strategies and patronize them for their inability to reign in fundamentalism. Contrarily, several cables from WikiLeaks indicated that corrupt African regimes were using fear over Islamic fundamentalism as a bargaining tool to gain Western support . The United States backed Ben Ali as a block to al Qaeda.
The Muslim Brotherhood is seen by many as a radical, Islamist party. The leadership of the party denies that it is strictly fundamentalist and voiced its desire to work within democratic systems. Indeed, rather than being the fundamentalist enemy, the Brotherhood may serve as the friendly compromise. If a democratic system is put in place and the Brotherhood allowed to participate, it may be able to garner support from bases previously endorsing al Qaeda, alleviating concerns over extra-governmental fundamentalism and instead moderating Islamism within the system .
2. Islam is not disappearing from the region.
The protests have been primarily politico-economic in nature. Africans are demonstrating against corruption and high prices and for human rights and freedoms. Some have characterized these goals as “secular” and the uprisings as indicating a move away from Islam. Such a position is demeaning to both the people and to Islam. One’s religion need not be the only motivation in one’s life. Nor does a desire for the separation of church and state eliminate the idea of religion from public and individual life. An-Na’im discusses the mutual dependency of secularism and religion on each other .
Islam is not “dead” in Africa. On the contrary, it may face a rise as people experience greater freedom to move and practice the religion in their preferred way.
3. We have not seen the end.
Protests are ongoing. The true outcome of Egypt and Tunisia’s “revolutions” is unclear, even though two prominent figures have been ousted from power. Whether or not power will shift in Libya is unclear. The protests increasingly occurring in sub-Saharan Africa may become stronger.
Academics and politicians find themselves in a tricky position of late. They must make decisions based on unclear futures. What is clear is that the people will no longer passively accept their fate. If there is one thing that can be learned from the recent events in the Middle East and Africa, it is that one cannot take the status quo for granted. Islam, states, and people are changing.

 
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Gillette Fellowship

Huzzah!

Dear Rebecca:

Congratulations on being selected by the Honors College scholarship committee to receive a 2011 Gillette Fellowship.

This year, Gillette Fellows receive $3,000 to cover living expenses for two months of the summer so that they are free to begin their research work. Fellows also will receive up to a maximum of $500 of support from the Honors College Research Fund for senior research costs. Fellows may not be enrolled for classes during the summer and must submit a brief report at the end of the summer. Please send me a brief note accepting your Fellowship and indicating that you understand and will comply with these conditions. Finally please note that recipients are asked to express acceptance and appreciation of the award in writing within six weeks of notification of the award with correspondence to be addressed to:

Dean of the Honors College
Michigan State University
105 Eustace-Cole Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824-1041

Let me again offer my congratulations. I hope your research project turns out to be even more interesting and exciting than you planned.

Sincerely,

Dr. Cynthia Jackson-Elmoore
Dean and Professor, Honors College
Michigan State University

Econ Presentation

This morning was my group presentation in Economics 498: Economics of Health Care on Health Information Technologies and Meaningful Use. The presentation went very well and the professor seemed pleased. Kevin and I tried to go to Tony’s for strawberry French toast before class, but they apparently don’t open that early. So we had Cosi instead. Had yummy oatmeal with fresh strawberries and a strawberry-mango smoothie. It was probably better for my digestive system than twelve thousand calories of whipped cream anyway.
: )

Easter Monday Breakfast

Spencer and I went to Golden Harvest in Lansing's Golden Harvest. Brilliantness itself. I had challah French toast (inspired idea; challah's amazing even plain) with blackberry-peach fruit topping and custard. Oh my goodness. Every part of my body is amazingly happy right now, most of all my mouth.

Happy Easter!

Happy Easter, or end of Passover, or April 25, whichever you'd like. : )

Food is good. Food is very, very good.
Had a great church service yesterday morning, and then had Easter dinner with family friends. Through a set of circumstances that was entirely not my fault, I ended up at Olive Garden with a group of six friends late last night, many of whom came back to the house to hang out afterward.
Seriously. Don't know how it happened. But it was delicious.

Shopping!

We have had an amazingly successful shopping day.
Though I should be writing a paper. Oh, look. I'm not! :)
Penny's for some clothes; got several really good items for my summer wardrobe.
And then we went to DSW and found some white heels for my Easter dress.
This afternoon, I'll be prepping for Easter, baking homemade bread, and distracting myself with books, movies, and maybe even a paper or two until I break fast at midnight!

Gendered Resources: Food and Water Access in the Middle East and North Africa

Introduction
Around the world, men and women interact with their environment in different ways as the result of gender roles. As the result of these gender roles and power relationships, women in much of the developing world have less access to food and water resources than men. Even as they face lesser supply, women generally have a greater demand for environmental assets than men as the result of these same gender roles. Preparing food for the entire family and household chores such as cleaning and laundering requires a great deal of water and food. When women are not given access to these resources, their jobs become more difficult and their status worsened.
Food security is not simply the meeting of a human body’s biological caloric requirement, but the freedom people have in knowing that they will at all times “have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (UN FAO). Food security is contingent on three parameters – availability, accessibility and affordability (Krishnaraj). Too often, the problem is one of access, not of quantity (Smith). Thus women who work all day in agricultural labor, touching food every waking hour, still cannot afford to feed their children. The poor often do not have access to food and water, even when it is overabundant in their area (Smith).
Additionally, food and water security are inevitably bound together. Without meeting one, meeting the other becomes almost pointless. One must be water secure to be food secure; low levels of food security put a person at greater risk for waterborne disease. A critical piece of the puzzle is also land use, as pointed out by Mjoli.
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, individuals have particularly stressful relationships with the Earth due to arid conditions, highly-regulated access to natural resources, and harsh politico-economic conditions. This paper will explore gendered access and needs to environmental resources in the MENA region. After a brief explanation of feminist political ecology, existing literature will be reviewed to present the problem, discuss how scholarship in this region often neglects gender issues, and demonstrate how development policies can help to enhance or diminish gender equality in environmental access.

Feminist Political Ecology
Political ecology seeks to understand people’s relationship with their environment, exploring how the environment is utilized, accessed, and valued by individuals, groups, and institutions. Political ecology looks at political, social and economic contexts locally, regionally, nationally, and globally that influence how actors are able and choose to interact with their environments. Feminist political ecology (FPE) deals with the complex context in which gender interacts with class, race, culture and national identity to shape our experience of and interests in ‘the environment’” (Rocheleau et al., pp. 5). FPE explores such issues as the gendered division of labor, access to decision-making and power over environmental regulations and quality, and land ownership and use rights. The “environment,” for feminist political ecologists, is not merely the dichotomized “natural world,” made distinct by Western minds from the cultured human world, but includes bodies, people, urban areas, and international movements. A person’s environment is the grand total of the world in which they live and act, and all of that environment has the potential to help or harm the individual, just as she can help or harm the environment.
Specific to issues of food and water security, feminist political ecology is concerned with how gender roles impact access to food and water resources. Feminist political ecologists would be interested in who is responsible for providing food, who uses water and how they obtain it, and who is recognized in society as having access to and responsibility for environmental resources. FPE would critique a society in which women are expected to cultivate a plot of land for family subsistence agriculture but not given land rights and a state in which migrant male workers are subjected to long hours of irrigating agricultural labor without access to clean water themselves. Both of these occur in the MENA region, as will be shown in the next section.

Literature Review
The first statement that must be made in a literature review discussing the intersections of feminist political ecology, food and water security, and the Middle East and North Africa is that there is a distressing lack of literature to review. Globally, attention to issues of food and water security is greatly focused on sub-Saharan Africa. There is a good amount of feminist political ecology happening in this region, as well as Asia (thanks mostly to Vandana Shiva) and Latin America. But very little attention is given to concerns of environmental justice, food and water security, and women’s relationship to the environment in MENA. Where literature does exist, it is predominately focused on irrigation technologies rather than discussing issues of distribution and access. Where women are mentioned, they are often barely a footnote. And too often, they do not even merit a footnote. In over two hundred pieces of literature reviewed that do address broad issues of food and water in the Middle East and North Africa, only fifty even contained the word “women,” and the authors are almost exclusively male.
Theoretically, there is a great deal of literature addressing gendered access to resources around the globe. It is no surprise, given the near-universal truth of women’s subordination and disempowerment. Why should access to environmental resources be any different? What makes women and the environment significant, though, is the idea that women are somehow “closer to nature” (discussed by Ortner). Thus women, while being denied equal rights in political, economic, and cultural institutions on the basis of their uncultured, natural instincts, are also denied greater – or even equal – access to the nature with which they are associated.
The relationship between gender roles and access to environmental resources is not a one-way street. Just as women are prevented from equal access on the basis that they are less competent than men, lesser access to these resources can result in lower cognitive functioning (Yount). The idea that women are weaker and less intelligent than men thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as “weak, dumb” females are given less food, water, and other resources from a very early age and are prevented from developing as well as their male counterparts.
The Role of Religion
Islamic societies, and the Middle East, are well-known in Western media and discourse for their oppression of women. While much of this discourse is problematic and homogenizing, general trends indicate that women in the MENA region lack equality with men (as they do in the United States). Women’s common lack of economic and political opportunities has been noted by several authors, including Moghadam, Nelson, Skalli, and Sørli et al. This is not to say that women’s oppression is caused by Islam, however. Bahramitash argues that international political economic forces seem to have a greater influence in women’s economic roles than Islam, at least in Iran.
Though we cannot blame religious institutions singularly for women’s oppression and unequal gender roles, this does not mean religion does not have a place in discussions about food and water security. Indeed, the religious implications and uses for food and water must be considered. Sered discusses the connection between “food and holiness,” presenting data about how important cooking can be for Jewish women, even seen as a “sacred act.” Food and water have central roles in many religious rituals in Islam, Judaism, and other religions of the Middle East and North African region.
Linking Gender, Equality, and the Environment
Academic discourses explore food and water insecurity and issues of equality, but this is often broadly focused rather than addressed specifically to the Middle East. Where notions of environmental inequalities are discussed in MENA, gender is generally not the focus. El-Ghonemy explores the relationship between food security, overall inequality, and rural development in North Africa. El-Ghonemy concludes that the lesser the land distribution inequality, the greater the chance that agricultural growth benefits will reach the poor and poverty will be quickly eliminated is; egalitarian agrarian structures are more likely to improve nutrition, health, and educational opportunities; and the more rural individuals can achieve earnings from non-land assets, remittances, and non-agricultural activities, the better they are able to overcome poverty. This means that eliminating the income gap between rural and urban communities requires governments to regard rural areas as more than simply agricultural. It also demonstrates that equality in environmental access can help strengthen equality in other sectors and improve quality of life for the community as a whole.
Ethelston’s article entitled “Water and Women: The Middle East in Demographic Transition” could serve as the poster child for the division of discourse about water resources and women’s empowerment. She asserts that “[i]n assessing demographic challenges facing the MENA region, two concerns stand out: the need for fresh water resources critical for long-term economic development, and the status of women,” and yet says literally nothing about the link between the two. Women are never associated with water; they are dealt with entirely separately. This, though water is characterized by Mjoli as a “woman’s issue.” Indeed, food and water security are more likely to be associated with military power than with women (Scanlan and Jenkins, Sørli et al.).
Ethelston is right to draw attention to water use as a demographic issue. Wallace et al. discuss the rapidly increasing use of freshwater resources as world population rises. They assert that humanity must be careful in its use and ensure equitable use with the environment. Concerns over gendered access to food and water resources must not focus solely on human use, but take into consideration the long-term ecological implications of that use. Women must not fight for the right to rape the Earth as violently as men do, but instead promote ways for all of humanity to live in a greater balance with the environment.
One indicator of gendered relationships with the Earth is the gender ratio of the agricultural labor force. In an gender-equal society, 50-50 ratios of men to women in all sectors of the economy would be expected. This, of course, is not seen in any sector today. The agricultural sector, though, is particularly problematic. As with all statistics, how and who measures can result in very different conclusion. Dixon shows that population censuses yield much lower proportion of females in agricultural labor forces than studies sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Statistical truths are also greatly impeded by the fact that women are incredibly likely to engage in informal subsistence agriculture; this is also acknowledged by Wenger and Stork.
Often, gendered differences in access to environmental resources and economic status result in very different understandings of the world between genders. A study by Briggs, et al. in upper Egypt indicates that environmental knowledges have become divergent between Bedouin men and women. The authors acknowledge that interactions with the environment, and thus knowledge and understandings of one’s role with it, are fluid and changes with circumstances.
In a particularly interesting article, DeRose, et al. argue that recognition of female disadvantage in calorie intake is problematic. Too often, this fact is interpreted by policymakers as requiring a focus on women’s food security. The authors argue that women’s reduced caloric intake is instead the result of women’s poverty. Pointing to access to food as the main cause of women’s poor health allows governmental officials to blame individual households rather than systemic injustices in the health care system and gendered institutions. It is important not to conflate women’s status and food security too greatly, or other issues of empowerment and disadvantage are excused from criticism and change. This article can serve to caution feminist political ecologists in being too reductionist; women’s access to environmental resources is one form of gendered oppression and power relations but cannot be seen as the only component, cause, or result.

Gender, Food, and Water in the Middle East and North Africa
In the 2003 FAO study, ~41% of the population in the Gaza Strip was food insecure (UN FAO, “Executive Report,” pp. 16). A huge proportion of this food insecurity is due to insufficient water security: More than 60% of water consumption in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is for agricultural purposes (UN FAO, “Main Report,” pp. 7). In times and places when a population is both food and water insecure and more than half their water goes to food, it often means people are deciding between giving a sick child a drink and having another meager meal. Though the geographic and political circumstances of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are intensifying food and water insecurity, numbers are all too similar for Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and other states in the region.
The FAO report further indicates the vast inequalities between women and men’s caloric intakes and environmental accesses. Men are more likely than women to be involved in paid or income-earning labor (and, ironically, this is often agricultural labor, even though the household is too poor to purchase the food just produced by their men’s labor). Women are often responsible for household chores requiring water (laundry, cleaning, cooking), but do not have equal access to water sources – let alone clean water sources.
The inequality between men and women in environmental access is not always the result of family dynamics and direct oppression; rather, it has become entrenched in the system and even the formal state. Nations that have shifted their economies to the agricultural sector ration limited freshwater supplies, giving good water to large, corporate food producers and denying it to women attempting to clothe and feed their children.
Nor is women’s oppression in food and water security homogeneous. Mothers-in-law do not access the environment in the same way as their daughters-in-law do; Bedouin women experience food security in a vastly different way than Jewish women.

Conclusions
There is a crisis going on. People are unnecessarily starving and dying from waterborne diseases in the Middle East and North Africa because no one with power is paying any attention. Though there are clear issues of food and water security across societies and groups in the Middle East and North Africa, the issue receives no significant attention in academic discourse, international aid work, or regional governmental policies. Part of this is the result of world power priorities: The Middle East is seen as a militarized region, to be used or subdued as required, rather than as a heterogeneous region with a multitude of problems, trying to develop on its own terms. As a result, international aid supports food security research and improvement in sub-Saharan Africa while ignoring it in MENA, instead funneling billions of military aid dollars to those states deemed as “friendly.”
This must be changed. Hunger feels the same in Morocco as it does in Ethiopia; unsafe water can kill a boy in Lebanon just as easily as a girl in Malawi. Attention to MENA food and water security must be demanded. Feminist political ecology is one area particularly well positioned to do so. Indeed, feminist political ecologists must apply their worldview and scrutiny on the MENA region or they buy into the further homogenization of women (Leach provides a good discussion of how this homogenization occurs). The little research that currently exists is incredibly limited, and groups “women” as a collective group. Without FPE’s sharp lens, women in the Middle East and North Africa will continue to be seen as a homogenous group, disempowered as the result of Islam, with little or no attention given to the various power relationships involved and how these roles affect society and development.
The Middle East and North Africa will not develop without improvement in the issues of both gender equality and food and water security. The two matters are inextricably linked. It is time that development discourse paid attention.

 
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