The Role of Water in Israeli Foreign Policy

Below is a paper written for a senior seminar in Madison on Israeli foreign policy...enjoy (or intelligently skip to the next blog post!).

A lay observer – and, indeed, even many informed scholars – thinking about Israeli foreign policy is almost certainly going to have issues of traditional security in mind. “Israeli foreign policy” instantly brings to mind phrases like “Arab-Israeli conflict,” “Security Wall,” and “occupation.” Images commonly associated with the topic include the unprecedented Rabin and Arafat handshake, IDF soldiers with guns, and paratroopers at the Western Wall.
An insider’s view of Israeli foreign policy does not necessarily conflict with the stereotype described above. The unfortunate truth is that Israeli foreign policy is heavily dominated by security concerns, and has been since before the country’s inception. How is it, then, that a country formally at war with at least one neighbor at all times and greatly preoccupied with concerns of survival has nonetheless given a great deal of attention to water concerns in its foreign policy decision-making?
This paper seeks to demonstrate that Israeli foreign policy makers have found creative ways to incorporate water issues in foreign policy so that the country’s scarce water resources become not an additional instigator of conflict but instead a creator of improved international relations for the country. I find that Israeli water policy is better explained by liberalist and constructivist theories of international relations than by realism.
The focus on water in Israeli foreign policy making will be explored in three major priorities of foreign policy: state-building and legitimacy, commerce and trade, and peace and security. The foreign policy decisions that are made in each of these three areas will be explored, focusing on who is responsible for determining water policy, how decisions are made, and the outcomes of water-based policies.
After a brief description of the methodology involved in this research, this paper will provide an explanatory background, a discussion of the results, a presentation and refutation of a counter-argument, several policy recommendations based on findings, and an exploration of how this research’s outcome contributes to existing debates in international relations and water policy. The background section includes a country profile of Israel’s water supply and demand as well as an exploration of current theories surrounding water-based policies and international relations. The results section is split into three sub-sections, each providing specific case studies illustrating how water has influenced foreign policy in the sector and how foreign policy decisions are made. The counter-argument will address concerns over the extent to which Israeli foreign policy has been innovative, as well as arguments about the nature of water in international realtions. Policy recommendations will focus on both Israel and other nations, encouraging Israel to more fully incorporate water in domestic and foreign policy-making and other states to follow Israel’s example in sustainable use. Finally, the bibliography formally cites all sources referenced throughout the paper and also includes suggested further reading for interested individuals.

Methodology
While based primarily on a literature review, the results of this study also incorporate the analysis of primary sources and news articles, examination of technical reports, and firsthand experience.
There is a wealth of research and theory surrounding issues of natural resource policy, water wars, and agricultural commerce. The work of authors such as Alatout, Allan, Amery, Feitelson, Fischhendler, Giordano, Haddadin, Lipchin, Tal, and Weinthal has been reviewed to situate this paper’s arguments in broader issues of water in the Middle East and international relations around natural resources. This literature, along with a variety of technical reports from organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), has aided in the formulation of a country water profile for Israel, presented in the next section.
In order to focus on how foreign policy decisions affect water use and vice versa, international treaties, a political leader’s personal journals, and news articles have been scrutinized for consideration of water issues. The Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements (better known as the Oslo Accords) signed in 1993, the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt of 1979, and the 1994 Treaty of Peace between the State of the Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan were closely examined. Relevant journal entries from the personal diary of David Ben-Gurion have been useful in highlighting the awareness and decision-making processes of Israel’s political leadership. News articles from Israel’s Haaretz and Jerusalem Post, Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News, and Europe’s BBC and EuroNews were used to identify current events that have not yet made it into peer-reviewed academic articles as well as plans that were not necessarily made into formal policy or officially recorded. Finally, the website of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been monitored for evidence of water-based priorities and initiatives.
Summer 2010, I participated in two study abroad programs facilitated by the Michigan State University Department of Jewish Studies. The first of the programs, “Nature, Culture and Environmental/Natural Resource Sustainability in a Green Israel,” was spent traveling through the country, exploring issues of sustainable water use, technical innovations in agriculture and desalination, and other environmental concerns. The second program, “MSU Jewish Studies Summer Program at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,” focused on the country’s political history and contemporary culture and society. The summer provided useful background and pointed the way toward valuable sources and authors. I am grateful for guidance given by Professors Eric Aronoff, Mike Aronoff, Yael Aronoff, and David Mendelsson.
Case studies have been chosen based on relevance and significance. Following authors such as Klieman, I have grouped my analysis based on foreign policy priorities. State-building and legitimacy, commerce and trade, and peace and security were chosen as three priorities vital to any nation’s foreign policy agenda, thus allowing for the possibility of parallel studies based on other countries’ water policies.

Background
Before analyzing water-based Israeli foreign policy, this paper will present a brief overview of international relations theory surrounding water and an exploration of Israel’s water resources. As with any other resource, Israel’s decision-making regarding water is influenced by the ways in which the resource is regarded by the international community and is constrained by the limited resources it has.

Water as a Resource
Many resources have multiple potential uses, but water is perhaps the least monolithic natural resource. Soy can be used to feed people, nurture livestock, and create fuel. Air is vital for life, can be used in transport, and can generate energy. Water, though, is necessary to produce soy, equally vital for life, also valuable for transit, and is used to access, create, and manipulate a multitude of other resources. It is also a much more excludable resource than air, as its sources can be controlled and certain individuals denied access. Thanks to the necessity of water, water is an incredibly valuable resource for states. As a result of the multitude of water’s uses, states and individuals treat different kinds of water resources in very different ways. Water used in agriculture is not seen as the “same” resource as water used for transport. Water consumed directly by citizens is viewed distinctly from water used to generate power. While the physical water used in these different ways may be the same water, who controls it and how it is valued changes depending on its current form and intended use. In short, “the water issue means different things to different actors. Water is a highly complex, fragmented issue, which possesses special qualities that distinguish it from other foreign relations determinants. While water is not usually an issue to some actors, under conditions of severe shortage it is highly conflict-prone.”
Due to the relative scarcity of water in the Middle East, the issue has received a great deal of scholarly attention. For decades, authors have predicted that water will likely be the cause of the next major war in the region . Concerned academics have predicted that “[t]ensions over freshwater resources may become more frequent as pressures on water resources grow due to increased demand and variability of rainfall.” Exploring a conflict that almost became a water war between Israel and Lebanon, Amery states that “While most international water disputes in the Middle East will be resolved peacefully, some are likely to trigger violent confrontations threatening political stability in the Middle East in the next few decades.” In disputes that are not water-driven, water woes can become an additional irritant, creating yet another barrier to peaceful solutions. For example, Giodano has pointed to water as one of the concerns cited by Palestinians during the Second Intifada, even though water did not play a causal role.
The scholarly opinions above are in line with the “water wars rationale” argument and situated in realist theory of international relations. This line of thinking “predicts that countries will wage war to safeguard their access to water resources, especially if there is water scarcity, competitive use and the countries are enemies due to a wider conflict.” The scarcity of water is seen as “a zero-sum security issue” and thus “a constant potential for conflict.” This mindset, of course, forecasts a multitude of water wars in the Middle East. And yet the dire predictions of academics touting the water wars rationale are beginning to sound like the boy who cried “Wolf!” While the Middle East is certainly wrought with tension, very few serious military engagements have occurred between states, and “the record of acute conflict over international resources is historically overwhelmed by the record of cooperation.” Indeed, it seems that “water has not been a catalyst for war in the Middle East.”
The lack of water wars in the Middle East has helped to further the claims of some academics arguing that scarce water resources can be a vehicle for peace rather than conflict. Recognizing the obvious logic of the water wars rationale, scholars state “the water issue paradoxically is also a possibly unique vehicle for cooperation if the parties view that as the only possible solution.” A study of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty highlighted how in “cooperation which is specifically over water, the critical feature that emerges is that through cooperation the countries were able to safeguard their long-term water supply. In other words, cooperation is water rational.” Viewed in this light, scarce water resources are not any less important to states than they are in the water wars theory; instead, cooperation is seen by the actors as the only way to have long-term water security.
This investigation sought to understand whether Israeli water policy is more reflective of the realist water wars rationale or the liberalist model of cooperation. I argue that the water wars rationale does not adequately explain international relations around water in the Middle East region, and that Israeli foreign policy more accurately reflects liberalist understandings. In seeking to understand why this is, an awareness of the water resources Israel has, the resources its neighbors have, and the resources that are inevitably shared is vital.

Israel’s Water Profile
Israel is a semi-arid nation in a region that “ran out of water resources to meet its strategic needs—for domestic and industrial use as well as for food production—in 1970.” The country is slightly smaller than the country of El Salvador but has only one fifteenth of El Salvador’s renewable water resources. Of its 20,770 contested square kilometers, only 440 square kilometers are water, and a great portion of those resources do not hold freshwater. Its Mediterranean coastline is 273 kilometers and it has a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, providing the country with essentially unlimited saltwater.
By far, Israel’s most important water resource is the Kinneret Basin, housing the historic “Sea of Galilee.” The basin produces approximately 500 million cubic meters per year, some twenty-seven percent of the country’s yearly national production. The coastal basin or coastal aquifer runs along the west coast of Israel and is another of the country’s main sources of groundwater. The Yarqon-Taninim Basin, Mount Carmel Basin, Eastern Mountain Basin (containing the Dead Sea), and Negev and Arava Basin are also found in Israel and contain smaller aquifers. Much of their water resources are brackish. Total, Israel’s groundwater resources come to approximately 950 million cubic meters, the Jordan River and Kinneret provide 600 million cubic meters, and floodwater runoff adds some 60-100 million cubic meters.
In 1964, Israel instituted the National Water Carrier to transfer water from major groundwater sources to heavily populated areas. As a result of increasing population demands, Israel’s freshwater use is incredibly high. In 2009, the country abstracted some 220 cubic meters per capita. In the same year, the US abstracted some 1,630 cubic meters. Unfortunately, Israel’s abstraction represented 86.4 percent of its internal resources, while the US’ represented only 19.6 percent. Israel consumes more than its annual natural supply by some 300 million cubic meters. The aquifers described above are greatly depleted. Climatic changes have meant decreasing rainfall, resulting in declining natural recharge. Since 1930, the Dead Sea, shared with Jordan, has lost one-third of its surface area. The Jordan River, once a strongly flowing source of freshwater, no longer reaches the Dead Sea as it used to.
As if the limited water resources detailed above weren’t worrisome enough, any discussion of Israel’s water profile must include a look at which water resources are still contested. The Jordan River is a major source of limited fertile ground in the region; yet, its West Bank is controlled mainly by the Palestinian Authority and will almost certainly become part of the Palestinian state. Lake Kinerret, Israel’s largest single freshwater source, is located on a disputed boundary with Syria, and Israel may need to trade some access to it for peace with that nation. Israel’s southernmost tip provides access to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aqaba, but, as was shown in the 1967 War, this access is not absolutely guaranteed. The Mediterranean, once seemingly the least contested of Israel’s water resources, is now becoming a source of great tension, as the combined result of the Gaza Blockade and feuds over gas and oil reserves near Cyprus.
In short, Israel wants a lot and has a little, both in regards to freshwater for consumption and unchallenged water boundaries for transport. This water profile seems incredibly pessimistic. Thanks to innovations in irrigation, however, Israel is using less and less water to produce more and more agricultural goods. Thanks to innovations in desalination, the country may manage to begin “producing” freshwater in the quantities it requires. Thanks to peace treaties and international agreements, Israel’s use of water for transport is becoming less restricted. The results of this investigation detail how Israel is creatively approaching water resources in its foreign policy making, using its limited water profile to great results.

Results
Water is critical to any nation’s policy. The extent to which it enters foreign policy decision-making depends on the specific conditions of the country’s resources and geopolitical situation. Israel, as a nation in an arid region and a country facing nearly constant imminent threat, sees water as a more critical national interest than water-rich or militarily secure countries such as the United States and Brazil. As previously stated, this investigation grouped water use by three main categories: state-building and legitimacy, commerce and trade, and peace and security. The role of water in each of these foreign policy objectives and the decisions that are made will be analyzed in the following sections.

State-Building and Legitimacy
A central goal of Zionism’s efforts in the Palestinian land was to “make the desert bloom.” Ludicrous though this may sound, it was indeed the policy carried out for decades, even before the state of Israel was founded in 1948. Agriculture was meant to be the great equalizer. Professors, musicians, engineers, all came together to work the soil, getting back to what they saw as their Jewish heritage of farming.
While agricultural productivity was an ideological motivation for many early settlers, it was also a critical component of Zionist methodology in attempting to secure a state in the Palestinian land. Beginning with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the principle of “effective occupation” required that European powers hoping to hold colonies in Africa were required to use the land productively, engaging in trade and resource extraction from the protectorate. Because Zionist leaders were seeking European permission to declare statehood in the Palestinian area, showing that they could use the land effectively was a purposeful technique in furthering Zionist goals. Making the desert bloom, and engaging in agriculturally-based trade with Europe, was seen as a way to demonstrate their proper right to the land. Agricultural policy, then, was foreign policy. When the community declared statehood in 1948, agriculture continued to be seen as an essential part of the young nation’s development. “Israel’s emergence as an agricultural country was a matter of choice.”
Water, of course, is a vital component in agriculture. “The need to control and disperse water resources has been a central facet in the development of the territorial, demographic and economic bases of the State of Israel.” Israel purposely decided to invest in water for the agricultural sectors. In the beginnings of the 1950s, the new nation invested nearly seventy-five percent of its foreign currency earnings to create a national water carrier, a deliberate choice to have agriculture produced in the south. Water for agricultural purposes has continued to dominate Israel’s water sector. All of Israel’s water resources are administered by the Israeli Water Commission. The head of this department is under the Minister of Agriculture’s authority, illustrating the extent to which water is considered vital to agriculture in Israeli policy. To this day, the Ministry of Agriculture works with the Jewish Agency “in the establishment and consolidation of new communities” and is a sub-division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrating how the early Zionist principle of water and agriculture for state-building continues to play a role in foreign policy today.
Agriculture in Israel has not come without cost. Around thirty-five percent of potable and recycled water used in agriculture are subsidized by Israel’s household sector. This means that agriculture is one of the only sectors in Israel that does not pay for its water use in its entirety. Agriculture continues to be Israel’s largest water consumer . Though the National Water Carrier was meant to satisfy the entire country’s water needs for the foreseeable future, a combination of drought and increasing demand has led to over-pumping. Agriculture in the Negev has thus majorly added to this increasing demand. In the early years of Israel, water policy focused on increasing water resources along with agricultural production. In later decades, the country prioritized agricultural expansion over water conservation.
Israel’s use of water in agriculture has conflicting effects. On one hand, the agricultural sector increases demand for water in a region where effective policy would seem to necessitate minimizing water demand. On the other hand, Israel’s focus on agriculture was a key component in state-building, and water-based agricultural innovations and agriculture-based trade have helped to create better relations with other countries, improving Israel’s legitimacy. These water-based agricultural innovations and agriculture-based trade relations will be explored in the next section.

Commerce and Trade
As shown above, Israel has invested heavily in water for agriculture and direct consumer use through the National Water Carrier and Water Authority. But Israel is slowly waking up to its water realities, becoming aware of the fact that its agricultural sector cannot continue to use as many of its water resources unsustainably. The nation has reacted to its water shortages in two major ways: seeking to increase supply and working to decrease demand. Major technological innovations have been made in Israel thanks to the country’s investment in water-based research and development. Through the reuse of treated wastewater, desalination of brackish and seawater, and the filtration of lake water, Israel has managed to increase its supply. These methods, however, have resulted in price increases. Seeking to decrease demand, Israel has been a pioneer in drip irrigation methods, water pricing mechanisms, and block tariffs (in which water prices increase by quantity so that individuals and corporations using great quantities of water pay more for “excess” usage).
The above initiatives have made a name for Israel as a sustainable, “green” country. According to Alon Tal, however, this focus on sustainability was the result of practical pragmatism rather than an ecologically focused ideology. Regardless of the motivations, Israel has made many incredible water revolutions.
Israel has capitalized fully on these advances. Most obviously, it has managed to make much of the desert bloom and continues to do more than its limited water resources would suggest. Beyond basic water use issues, though, Israel has used its water-based developments to strengthen ties with other countries. This ideology of foreign relations was first espoused by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, who said that “the principles of mutual assistance and equality should also constitute the basis for international relations between people...[and] must be based on the solidarity of all human beings derived from fraternity and mutual assistance in every sphere of life - economic, social and scientific...”
Following the beliefs of Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been innovative in international commerce, using not only its material resources as a mechanism for trade but also its information and technological advances. Israel currently has full diplomatic relations with nearly all of sub-Saharan Africa, even though it has no relations with most North African countries. A major reason for this is the work of MASHAV, the Center for International Cooperation, an initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that exports water-based technological knowledge to the developing world. This information sharing and technological collaboration plays a role in the peace process – “trainees come from countries which as yet have no diplomatic relations with Israel.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works to ensure that these information trades yield fruits of international cooperation through follow-up Shalom Clubs.
In addition to the work of MASHAV, Israeli and Egyptian academics and water policy officials have cooperated extensively on developing technologies for desalination. Israeli and Jordanian thinkers have collaborated on projects to restore the Dead Sea. November 21-27, 2011, Shimon Peres visited Vietnam and brought with him 60 Israeli leaders in trade and corporations, many of whom were focused on sharing water-based technologies and agricultural innovations with the Vietnamese government. This recent trip to Vietnam is but one example of Israel’s continued attempts to use its water know-how as a diplomatic tool. Visits to countries have been one key tool; another has been the hosting of conferences. Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, recently opened the 6th International Exhibition and 3rd International Conference on Water Technologies, Renewable Energy & Environmental Control. That the deputy foreign minister was the one to open this conference is evidence of how Israel sees water-based innovations as a tool in foreign policy.
Beyond water-based technology, Israel also uses water more directly in commercial affairs. Agriculture continues to be one of Israel’s major export products, though its relative importance has fallen over time and only two percent of Israel’s labor force is currently engaged in agricultural work. On the import side, Israel is a leader in “virtual water trade,” through which water-rich countries trade goods that require a great deal of water to produce (water-intensive goods) in exchange for water-extensive goods that are made more easily in the other country. In 2002, Israel was ranked twenty-fifth in the world as a virtual water importer.
Beyond agricultural-based and virtual water trades, Israel has been increasingly looking at trading water itself. In March 2004, Israel arranged to buy 50 million cubic meters of water from Turkey every year for twenty years, accounting for approximately three percent of Israel’s freshwater consumption. Israeli officials saw this water trade as a mechanism for strengthening ties with one of the only Muslim countries friendly to Israel, arguing that the trade was worth it for those ties even if the water itself was not worth the full cost. Unfortunately, this deal never came to fruition as relations between Israel and Turkey deteriorated over the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, which will be addressed more fully in the next section.
Despite its limited water resources, Israeli foreign policy makers have capitalized fully on water-based trade possibilities, fully exploiting technological innovations, virtual water goods, and agricultural production. This trade has aided Israel’s economy as well as improved ties with the international community.

Peace and Security
Water has played multiple roles in Israeli foreign policy concerns over peace and security. As mentioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informational trade has helped to further the peace process. On the security side of things, water has been an actor, if not the primary catalyst, in a number of military conflicts.
The most famous of the Israeli-Arab military confrontations is the Six-Day War of 1967. Prior to the 1967 War, the Arabs attempted to divert the Jordan River away from Israel. The nation prevented such a move militarily. This military action over water sources was not new. In 1948, Ben-Gurion advised the Israeli government to attack Latrun when the Arabs violated the current cease-fire by destroying a water pipe from Rosh Ha’ayin to Jerusalem. While these two incidents did not become long-term conflicts, they were components of longer-term military engagements.
In regards to the Six-Day War itself, a water-based concern was the primary instigator of the conflict. On May 22, 1967, “Nasser announced the closure of the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping.” Under international law, Egypt’s closure of the straits was an act of war. Israeli foreign policy officials debated what their next move should be. In the midst of reports of Arab military preparations and troop movements, Ben-Gurion noted in his diary that he believed the most important task was to open the straits. But he worried that doing so by force would almost certainly lead to war, something he and many other Israeli government officials wished to avoid. Israeli foreign policy makers appealed to the United States, requesting that Johnson move to open the straits on their behalf. In light of the US’ failure to do so, Israel elected to strike preemptively. In the resulting military action, Israel captured the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula, all of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and other lands previously administered by Arab states. The Six-Day War put into Israeli hands many territorial waters that had been governed by Arab nations.
Israel struck the Sinai Peninsula first, and foreign policy officials debated about whether or not to spread military action to the Golan Heights, then controlled by Syria. “In an interview given to Yedi’ot Aharonot given in 1976 but published in 1997, Dayan stressed the ‘greed’ of the Jordan Valley settlers for land and water as a primary motivation for pressuring the Israeli government to capture the Golan Heights.” “[T]he need to secure water resources played a crucial role in Israel’s geopolitical calculus with respect to its border with Syria.” Rabin was known for his aggressive fighting over the north’s water resources. Though it would be overreaching to state that water was the primary reason for Israel’s military action in the Golan, the fact that Dayan publically cited water as a motivation is indicative of how central a role water can play in foreign policy decision-making.
In the aftermath of the war, Israeli foreign policy officials took on a “land for peace” doctrine. The Sinai Peninsula was traded for recognition by Egypt; negotiations of peace with Syria have all included discussions of the Golan Heights. Beyond “land for peace,” however, Israel has seen “water for peace.” Before the full 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, there was a 1975 agreement on the Sinai and Suez Canal, allowing for Israeli non-military transport through the Suez. In the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Agreement, Article II guarantees that “territorial waters” will be recognized. Article III.6 also provides a guarantee against non-sanctioned military actions in the “airspace above their territorial waters.” Article V.2 seeks to ensure that the cause of the Six-Day War never happens again, allowing for both states’ use of waterways for transport: “The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other’s right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.” In the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979, water for consumer use as well as transport is addressed . Article V.3.f.2 permits Israel to maintain water lines at military installations. Article VI.3 guarantees that Israel will continue to have access to water supply points near El Arish and El Tor. An entire article of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty addresses water in an attempt to achieve “a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them.” Clear boundaries are drawn, and the two countries’ allocations from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers are made explicit. Both parties recognize the need for cooperation around water supply, promising to aid each other in preventing contamination of water resources and alleviating water shortages. The treaty includes a transfer from Israel to Jordan of 55 million cubic meters per year of potable water from the northern part of the country and a transfer of 20 million cubic meters per year taken from the Yarmouk River from Jordan to Israel. Cooperation between Israel and Jordan on water “has laid the groundwork for fuller cooperation between these countries.”
Israel has yet to obtain a peace treaty with Syria. Water is seen as one of the major barriers to Israeli-Syrian peace, let alone cooperation. Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights seems to be required for an Israeli-Syrian peace; “this process will undoubtedly have important implications for Israel’s future water supply.” Some authors argue that “Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights is in large part based on the same factor as its unwillingness to leave the West Bank: water.” Others hoped that Israeli-Turkish water trade might make Israeli-Syrian peace more probable thanks to decreasing water concerns , but the deterioration of that deal has negated that possibility. During negotiations that took place in 2000, Turkey was concerned because “Syria had consistently wanted Turkey’s commitment on the water issue in return for Israel’s continued access to Golan water.” Though Turkey was then an uncontested Israeli ally, it was not so friendly that it was willing to incur self-cost for Israeli-Syrian peace.
Water resources have been a primary source of both conflict and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authorities. In the 1980s, the Israeli-Palestinian water outlook was not optimistic. Israeli policy advisors were quick to point out that “the State of Israel must continue to control the water resources in the territories, both because of the danger to water reserves inside the Green Line and because it will be impossible to establish new Israeli settlements in these territories without control and supervision of the water resources.” The Israeli government has successfully maintained large amounts of control over water resources throughout both its internationally recognized territory and the territories technically controlled by the Palestinian Authority. New wells in the West Bank can be sunk only with a permit from the Water Commissioner offices at the Military Government headquarters. “The residents of the West Bank are doomed under Israeli occupation to consume one third of the domestic water consumption of Israeli residents in order not to affect the amount of water consumed in pre-1967 Israel proper.” Climate change and population growth are likely to increase “localised social unrest due to scarce water resources and competition.”
In spite of the somewhat pessimistic outlook in the paragraph above, Israel and Palestine have actually maintained a decent level of cooperation over consumer-based water resources. Scholars expect the Israeli-Palestinian water situation to be manageable unless the region sees “very high population growth in the context of inadequate co-operation between Israel and Palestine.” Given the current level of cooperation, there does not seem to be an immediate need for concern. Article 40 of the Oslo Accords dealt entirely with issues of water and sewage. The first principle stated “Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank.” Details of the article provided for maintaining current supplies and increasing where there were needs. The Article also created a “Joint Water Commission” (JWC), through which Israel no longer had uncontested control of water resources in the Palestinian territories. Israel now makes approximately 88 million cubic meters of water available to Palestinians per year.
The Israeli government has explicitly stated that “Israel believes that it can transform the issue of water from a possible source of controversy and tensions with the Palestinians to a basis for understanding and cooperation.” The Palestinian Authority and the state of Israel, primarily through the Joint Water Commission, “coordinate the management of water and sewage resources and systems in the West Bank.” The JWC has four sub-committees, each overseeing a major component of Israeli-Palestinian water cooperation: the hydrological committee (well drilling), the water works committee (supply pipelines), the sewage committee (wastewater treatment), and the water pricing committee (prices of water sold by Israel to the Palestinian Authority). Even though the JWC and its activities was created for the five-year interim period created by the Oslo Accords, Israeli and Palestinian water-based cooperation has continued beyond that time. “Development of water supply systems for the Palestinians has in the past decade been carried out on a very large scale, much larger than that stated in the Interim Agreement.”
More recently, the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010 involved an issue of water for transport and water as a boundary. Israel has a blockade on the Gaza Strip, preventing unauthorized ships from bringing supplies into Gaza. The Mavi Marmara flotilla claimed to contain only humanitarian aid supplies and attempted to dock in the Gaza Strip. The ships were confronted by Israeli forces in the Mediterranean. The ships’ crews refused to allow for Israeli inspection of the goods. In the resulting conflict, nine Turkish citizens were killed by IDF forces. Prior to the flotilla, Turkey had been Israel’s strongest allies in the region. Israeli foreign policy officials refused to apologize for their actions during the Mavi Marmara incident, however, leading to greatly deteriorated relations between the two countries. What was “one of the most significant regional developments since the end of the Cold War” fell apart over a conflict that took place in water. Relations have been further strained since the discovery of oil and gases off the shore of Cyprus. Conflict between Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Greece has become increasingly strained through confrontations over offshore drilling rights and safe passage through the eastern Med.

Counter-Argument
Water-based concerns have played a major role in Israeli foreign policy-making. The role of water in state-building and trade has been almost entirely positive for Israel, and the discussion above points to the creativity of Israeli foreign policy officials in using a limited water profile to the state’s advantage. But several incidents described in the section on Peace and Security seem to reflect the water wars rationale. Critics of my claim that Israel has been creative in regards to water might argue that Israel has behaved as any other nation would in the conflict around the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Blockade. And while Israel’s foreign policy has been much less unique in these situations, the country has shown incredible innovation in foreign policy in the other sectors. Interestingly, the two strongest incidents of Israeli non-creativity around issues of water-based foreign policy have taken place when water was playing the role of a barrier. It seems, then, that Israeli foreign policy has been unique in dealing with water as a resource for consumer use (including direct consumption, use for agriculture, use for tourism and ecology, etc.), but less so when water is seen as an extension of land-based borders or transport mechanisms. This, then, mostly debunks the water wars rationale (which treats water as a scarce resource to be used) while supporting an argument that states will act according to the expectations of realism in regards to issues of territory and border control.
While this paper has treated Israeli foreign policy decisions around water issues as substantial, this claim is not uncontested in the literature. Menahem has extensively explored water issues in Israel, but believes that water policy has barely touched governmental affairs. Indeed, according to Menahem, it is the fact that international agreements are starting to include water issues (the United Nations, for example, only recognized the “human right to water” in 2010), and so there is only now an international dimension to the water policy network in Israel. But the existence of water-based agreements and cooperation prior to 2010 is evidence that, whether or not water was explicitly acknowledged in international law prior to that year, Israel has involved it in foreign policy since the country’s birth.
A key assumption of this paper has been the unique and non-monolithic nature of water. Selby denies such a claim, arguing that “water problems should neither be understood in naturalistic nor in liberal- technical terms, but instead as questions of political economy; that water is structurally insignificant within the political economy of the modern Middle East; that in consequence water is generally unimportant as a source of inter-state conflict and co-operation.” Instead, Selby sees water as an issue only as insofar as it is related to the wider issue of economic development. But this claim does not fully discredit this paper’s conclusion. Regardless of whether Israeli foreign policy around issues of water is driven by water itself or the economic conditions surrounding water, the country has been creative in addressing the concerns.

Policy Recommendations
This paper has demonstrated that Israeli foreign policy makers have found unique ways to incorporate water issues in foreign policy, garnering positive results. The consequences of innovative foreign policy mean that water in Israel has been a creator of cooperation as much (if not more) as it has been an instigator of conflict. The most obvious policy recommendation from this result is also, arguably, the most important: Israeli foreign policy makers must continue focusing on the positive aspects of water rather than the negative, ensuring that their decisions can help encourage water-based cooperation rather than water-based conflict.
Specifically, Israeli officials should ensure that Israel’s water resources are equitably distributed, with special concern given to its Palestinian citizens and territories. With the UN’s recent recognition of water as a human right, policies that can be spun as “water abusive” will see increased international attention and censure.
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has demonstrated a remarkable ability to use the country’s water innovations as a diplomatic tool. This effort can be increased; the MFA should seek to enhance and more broadly portray itself as an international water leader.
Lastly, Israel should more aggressively seek out a peace agreement with Syria. The old concerns of water resources are becoming less and less of a problem due to water technologies that increase supply; Israel can demonstrate its goodwill toward its Arab neighbors by making the first move and consider water concessions in negotiations with Syria. Territorial and boundary waters have thus far been the sector in which Israeli foreign policy is least unique; making progress toward Syrian peace would be a great first step in making this sector more in line with Israel’s other water-based progressive policies.
Looking beyond Israel, this paper can also inform foreign policy for other nation-states. Other countries should seek to follow Israel’s example, not only by adopting innovative water-saving technologies, but by seeking to be as creative with their own limited resources as Israel has been with its water. Countries should seek to be equally innovative with scarce land, scarce oil, scarce fertile ground, scarce food resources, and the like. By doing so, and exporting their technologies, these countries may well be able to partner with Israel in creating a world that is able to address increasing global concerns of resource shortage.

Significance
The results of this paper have considerable significance for environmental public policy and water-based international relations. The nature of water reservoirs and seas requires that international agreements on water resources be “based on an integrated management system treating [a water resource] as one unity.” This nature can serve to essentially force cooperation. In a 2009 policy memo, the Israeli Water Authority points to its experience with the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty as precedent for the possibility of solutions for scarce water resources. It concludes by stating that “[i]nternational experience also shows that water agreements between countries are not a question of principles but one of practical action.” This paper has argued that Israeli foreign policy has been creative in dealing with water concerns, more fully reflecting liberal expectations than realist theories. But it is important to bear in mind that this does not make Israel any less concerned with national security. Rather, Israeli decision makers have taken risk and shown that innovative methods can be practical ones. While still prioritizing national security, Israel has managed to demonstrate that scarce resources need not be viewed as a zero-sum game by nation-state actors. Israeli innovations in water supply have created avenues for cooperation where some theorists have previously seen only initiators of conflict. Scholars of international relations must incorporate Israel’s approach in the theories and literature surrounding environmental international relations. Understanding how Israeli foreign policy officials have successfully used unique foreign policy to make limited water resources a useful asset can help other nations facing concerns over scarce resources.

 
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